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Act 187 of 1982, effective January 1, 1983, revised title XXIII
of book III of the Louisiana Civil Code dealing with occupancy, posses-
sion and acquisitive prescription,1 thus concluding the six-year-old revi-
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Articles 3412-3527 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870
[hereinafter cited as OA (old articles)] were repealed and replaced by
new articles 3412-3491 [hereinafter cited as NA]. Articles 3528-3554
dealing with liberative prescription were not revised by Act 187 of
1982. However, after the completion of this writing, articles 3528-3554
were revised by Act 173 of 1983, which becomes effective on January
1, 1984. With few exceptions, this Act is not discussed in this article.
Hereinafter, the "new Act" will refer to Act 187 of 1982. The provi-
sions of Act 187 pertaining to occupancy, articles 3412-3420, are also
not discussed in this article. Articles of the Civil Code of 1870 which
were not affected by Act 187 will be cited as UA (unaffected articles).
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sion of the law of property.2 The express changes brought about by
the new Act were not unpredictable to a careful observer of the
jurisprudence and are easily identified by a mere reading of the
comments.2 Less easily identifiable are the latent changes that may be
implicit in the language of the new law. The purpose of this article
is merely to present, rather than to discuss in depth,4 the express
changes and to help identify the latent changes. To this end, this
article follows the rather unconventional and space-consuming format
of juxtaposing visually the texts of the new and old law.- It is hoped
that this format will not only prove convenient to the reader, but
will also enable him to participate in the search for the latent changes
in the new Act."
In terms of organization, the new Act succeeds in arranging the
articles in a more logical, systematic and efficient way than the old
law.7 Two organizational changes are worth mentioning in this respect:
2. Book II of the Civil Code regulating the major bulk of the
law of property was revised in four installments from 1976 to 1979.
If the years of preparatory work are counted, the revision process
lasted well over a decade.
3. The adage that the comments are not part of the law is as
correct here as it is with any other enactment. 1982 La. Acts, No.
187, S 6. Nonetheless, one can hardly overstate their importance in
ascertaining-or speculating about-legislative intent and generally
in understanding the new Act. The comments are equally important
in following the discussion in this article which presupposes close
familiarity with the comments. The valuable information contained
therein has not been repeated here.
4. For a more detailed discussion, see Note, Working With the
New Civil Code Property Scheme: The 1982 Book III Revision, 43 LA.
L. REV. 1079 (1983).
5. To facilitate a more systematic treatment, it was necessary
not to follow the order in which the articles appear in either the new
or the old law. For technical reasons, this author's observations are
confined in the footnotes.
6. Because latent changes are often unintentional, the comments
cannot be safely relied upon in identifying all changes. Due to limited
insight and wisdom, the same is true about this author's observations.
Consequently, identifying all the latent changes may ultimately be
the reader's responsibility, and this article aspires simply to facilitate
the courts' and the attorneys' job by placing the new and old law
side by side.
7. In addition to the internal rearrangement of articles, which
may have some substantive implications, see infra notes 8-16 and
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(1) The old law defined the attributes or vices of possession and the
requirements for transfer and tacking of possession in the chapter
on acquisitive prescription rather than in the chapter on possession.'
The jurisprudence has recognized repeatedly that the same attributes
of possession necessary for prescription are also necessary for posses-
sion to be accorded possessory protection? Following this logic, the
new law regulates exhaustively the attributes of possession in the
title on possession ° and then refers to these articles later in dealing
with acquisitive prescription." Similarly, since tacking may be
necessary not only in the context of acquisitive prescription but also
in the context of the possessory action, 2 the new act regulates transfer
and tacking of possession in the title on possession." (2) The old law
regulated suspension and interruption of prescription in the section
on acquisitive prescription.'4 Yet it was never questioned that
liberative prescription, too, was subject to suspension and interrup-
tion and under the same conditions as acquisitive prescription." The
new Act eliminates this anomaly by placing the provisions on suspen-
sion and interruption before the chapters devoted to acquisitive and
liberative prescriptions."0
In terms of draftsmanship and legislative technique the new Act
is also a significant improvement over the verbose, repetitive, and
accompanying text, the new Act adopts a more flexible structure by
dividing the subject matter into two titles rather than the single title
XXIII of the 1870 Code. Occupancy and possession are now regulated
in new title XXIII and prescription in the newly created title XXIV.
The former title XXIV is now redesignated as title XXV.
8. See OA 3487-3491 and OA 3492-3495, respectively.
9. See, e.g., Liner v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 319 So.
2d 766 (La. 1975).
10. See NA 3435-3436.
11. See NA 3476, 3488.
12. See infra note 65.
13. See NA 3441-3443. As a result of these rearrangements, the
new chapter on possession contains, for the first time, more articles
(twenty-four) than the chapter on acquisitive prescription (nineteen).
The old law contained thirty-one articles in the chapter on possession
and fifty-six articles in the section on acquisitive prescription.
14. See OA 3516-3527.
15. See, e.g., UA 3551, 3554; Adams v. Aetna Casualty Ins. Co.,
205 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967), affd, 252 La. 798, 214 So.
2d 148 (1968).
16. See chapter 2, NA 3462-3472, preceding chapters 3 and 4, deal-
ing respectively with acquisitive and liberative prescription.
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often contradictory language of the old law'7 which was drafted in
a style reminiscent of a textbook for first-year law students. 8 While
helpful for law school freshmen, this style was hardly efficient. The
concise and more definitive style of the new Act is in accord with
modern drafting techniques and is a welcome improvement in this
respect. Brevity, of course, is not a virtue in itself. When the new
Act eliminates whole provisions of the old law as "unnecessary
illustrations" 9 there is always the possibility that something of the
substance of the old law may have been lost too. It is hoped that
the juxtaposition of the texts of the new and old law will help the
17. The old law devoted a total of 116 articles to occupancy,
possession and acquisitive prescription. The new Act regulates the
same subjects in only eighty articles. For some examples of extremely
verbose and/or repetitive provisions, see OA 3431, 3442-3444, 3501-3502,
all of which are dealt with in only two articles in the new law, NA
3431-3432; old articles 3493-3495 are dealt with in one article in the
new law, NA 3442; old articles 3483-3486 are also dealt with in one
article in the new law, NA 3483. Contradictions were also not uncom-
mon in the old law and are identified at appropriate places. See, e.g.,
infra note 18.
18. The scholar Domat was the major source of the provisions
on possession and acquisitive prescription in the Louisiana Digest of
1808. According to Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual
Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 131-33 (1971), Domat
is responsible for twenty of the forty-eight articles of the Digest of
1808 on the matter. While some of these articles were suppressed
in the 1825 revision of the Civil Code, most have survived. See, e.g.,
OA 3432-3435, 3451-3454, 3490, 3493-3495. The 1825 revision actually
increased rather than decreased the Code's reliance on French com-
mentators. For instance, OA 3427-3431 and 3436-3450 which were
added in the 1825 revision were all derived from French treatises-
this time mostly from Pothier-rather than from either the Code
Napoleon or the Projet du Gouvernement of 1800. A by-product of
this borrowing from multiple sources was an increase in the internal
inconsistencies in the Code. One such inconsistency is seen by com-
paring OA 3449(2), taken from Pothier, with OA 3455-3456 taken from
Domat. For a discussion of this issue, see the concurring opinion of
Justice Tate in Liner v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 319 So.
2d 766 (La. 1975). Another inconsistency, also attributable to the same
source, may be seen by comparing OA 3428 with OA 3430 and OA
3429 with OA 3431. For an example of purely didactic material, see
OA 3472-3477, 3484-3485.
19. See, e.g., NA 3412, comment (f); NA 3422, comment (c).
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reader distinguish the substantive changes from the mere stylistic
changes.
NEW LAW OLD LAW
DEFINITION, ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS AND NATURE OF POSSESSION
Art. 3421. Possession
Possession is the detention or
enjoyment of a corporeal thing,
movable or immovable, that one
holds or exercises by himself or
by another who keeps or exer-
cises it in his name.
20
The exercise of a real right,
such as a servitude, with the in-
tent to have it as one's own is
quasi-possession. The rules
governing possession apply by
Art. 3426. Possession, definition
Possession is the detention or
enjoyment of a thing, which we
hold or exercise by ourselves, or
by another who keeps or exercises
it in our name.
Art. 3432. Possession applicable




20. The definition of possession contained in NA 3421 para. 1 is
as incomplete as its predecessor, found in OA 3426. What is lacking
in both articles is the intent to possess as owner which, according
to NA 3424 and OA 3436, is essential for acquiring possession. Without
this intent one has only detention, not possession in the proper sense.
Thus a lessee is, properly speaking, a "detainer" rather than a
possessor, since he lacks the requisite intent to possess for. himself.
Although the Exposg des Motifs recognizes this inconsistency, see LA.
CIV. CODE bk. III, tit. XXIII, ch. 2, Exposi des Motifs (Supp. 1983), and
although earlier drafts took measures to correct it, the final draft chose
to preserve the status quo, apparently out of deference to long local
tradition. Yet, as it now stands, NA 3421 para. 1 serves no discerni-
ble purpose, since physical detention unaccompanied by an intent to
possess either for one's self or on behalf of someone else has no legal
effect and is not accorded posse ssory protection. See, e.g., NA 3424,
3428, 3435, 3477; LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3660. New article 3440, which
makes the possessory action available to the precarious possessor, is
not an exception to this statement since even a precarious possessor
has the intent to possess for another, see NA 3428, whereas the
"possessor" (i.e., party in detention) in NA 3421 para. 1 may not have
any such intent. The matter could potentially have disturbing conse-
quences since NA 3421 para. 1 purports to give the definition of a
term widely used throughout the Civil Code. Fortunately, such prob-
lems are avoided by reading NA 3421 para. 1 together with its
necessary complements, namely NA 3424 as well as NA 3432-3433.
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analogy to the quasi-possession of
incorporeals.21
Art. 3424. Acquisition of
possession
To acquire possession, one
must intend to possess as owner
and must take corporeal posses-
sion of the thing.22
Art. 3427. Presumption of intent
to own the thing
One is presumed to intend to
possess as owner unless he began
to possess in the name of and for
another.23
OLD LAW
only to corporeal things, movable
or immovable.
The possession of incorporeal
rights, such as servitudes and
other rights of that nature, is only
a quasi possession, and is exercised
by the species of possession of
which these rights are susceptible.
Art. 3436. Essentials of
possession
To be able to acquire posses-
sion of property, two distinct
things are requisite:
1. The intention of possess-
ing as owner.
2. The corporeal possession
of the thing.
Art. 3488. Possession presumed
to be as owner
As to the fact itself of posses-
sion, a person is presumed to have
possessed as master and owner,
unless it appears that the posses-
sion began in the name of and for
another.
Art. 3434. Possession linked to
ownership; possession implies
a right and a fact
Since the use of ownership is
21. The last sentence of the second paragraph of NA 3421 did
not exist in its predecessor OA 3432, but was implicit in the very
concept of quasi-possession. The jurisprudence had already recognized
this principle. See Louisiana Irrigation & Mill Co. v. Pousson, 262 La.
973, 265 So. 2d 756 (1972).
22. For the definition of corporeal possession, see NA 3425. For
acquisition of possession through others, see NA 3428.




NEW LAW OLD LAW
to have a thing in order to enjoy
it and to dispose of it, and that it
is only by possession that one can
exercise this right, possession is
therefore naturally linked to the
ownership.
Thus, possession implies a
right and a fact; the right to enjoy
annexed to the right of ownership,
and the fact of the real detention
of the thing that is in the hands
of the master or of another for
him.
Art. 3435. Possession without
ownership
Although the possession be
naturally linked with the owner-
ship, yet they may subsist
separately from each other; for it
may happen that the actual
possessor is not the true owner..4
24. Old articles 3434-3435 are typical examples of didactic material
that have no place in a modern code. The two articles were derived
from Domat, see Batiza, supra note 18, at 131. While they served some
purpose in the Digest of 1808, their utility was exhausted soon
thereafter with the growth of an indigenous legal profession. The sup-
pression of these two articles by the new Act is justified. Article 481
(enacted by Act 180 of 1979) is roughly parallel to OA 3435 only in
emphasizing that possession and ownership are distinct. Article 481
reads as follows: "The ownership and the possession of a thing are
distinct. Ownership exists independently of any exercise of it and may
not be lost by nonuse. Ownership is lost when acquisitive prescrip-
tion accrues in favor of an adverse possessor." An a contrario reading
of UA 481 suggests that possession is lost by nonuse. That inference
was confirmed by OA 3444 which provided that civil possession could
only last for a maximum of ten years. This is no longer true under
NA 3432. Possession cannot be lost by nonuse, but it is lost either
by abandonment, NA 3433, or by adverse use by another, NA 3422.
See infra notes 59 and 62. Part of the substance of OA 3434 para.
2 is now contained in NA 3422 which is discussed infra note 47.
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CORPOREAL, CONSTRUCTIVE AND CIVIL POSSESSION
Art. 3425. Corporeal possession
Corporeal possession is the
exercise of physical acts of use,




One who possesses a part of
an immovable by virtue of a title
is deemed to have constructive
possession within the limits of his
title.' In the absence of title, one
has possession only of the area
he actually possesses.
Art. 3428. Natural possession,
definition
Natural possession is that by
which a man detains a thing cor-
poreally, as by occupying a house,
cultivating ground, or retaining a
movable possession.
Art. 3430. Natural possession as
corporeal detention
Natural possession is also
defined to be the corporeal deten-
tion of a thing which we possess
as belonging to us, without any ti-
tle to that possession, or with a
title which is void.25
Art. 3437. Occupation of part as
basis for possession of whole
It is not necessary, however,
that a person wishing to take
possession of an estate should pass
over every part of it; it is suffi-
cient if he enters on and occupies
a part of the land, provided it be
with the intention of possessing all
25. The suppression of OA 3430 does not result in any substan-
tive change, not only because this article contained a useless and er-
roneous definition, but also because the article was read out of the
Code as early as 1841. See Ellis v. Prevost, 19 La. 251, 254 (1841).
26. Since constructive possession cannot prevail over adverse cor-
poreal possession, it goes without saying that "possession of a part
is possession of the whole" only when no one else possesses adversely
and corporeally any other part of the same "whole." Similarly, par-
tial dispossession from an immovable corporeally possessed by another
cannot serve as dispossession from the whole. Unfortunately, the Loui-
siana Supreme Court held to the contrary in Board of Comm'rs v.
S.D. Hunter Found., 354 So. 2d 156 (La. 1978). Although there is little
to suggest that the new Act approves of this erroneous holding, an
express disapproval in the comments would be welcome. For criticism
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of this aspect of Hunter, see 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY 5 215
in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 580 n.422 (2d ed. 1980).
The new Act also missed the opportunity to devise new rules
regulating conflicts between constructive possessions, and between what
one could call "constructive corporeal" and "constructive civil" posses-
sion. The following three deliberately simplistic hypotheticals may il-
lustrate the need for such rules.
(1) A and B both have titles describing the same tract of land and
enter simultaneously into corporeal possession of the Southwest and
Northeast quarters, respectively. To this author's knowledge neither the
old nor the new law provides the means of delineating A's and B's posses-
sion in the Northwest and Southeast quarters. The French solution of
giving preference to the older title sounds plausible but will not work
in a case, for instance, where both A and B derive their titles from legacies
contained in the same testament. See Roan v. Carter, 427 So. 2d 1337
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1983). Roan also demonstrates that tacking will not solve
the problem if both A and B trace their titles to a common author, since
his possession is not adverse. Moreover, although concededly a simultane-
ous entrance into possession is rather unlikely in practice, there remains
the problem of cases in which neither A's nor B's date of entrance into
possession can be established with certainty.
(2) Same facts as in (1) except that A established corporeal posses-
sion of the Southwest quarter and then ceased possessing corporeally
without abandoning his possession. B then moved into possession of the
Northeast quarter which he still possesses corporeally today. Arguably
A should still prevail in the Northwest, the Southeast, and afortiori the
Southwest quarters since his possession which was established construc-
tively and continued civilly could only be ousted by adverse corporeal,
not constructive, possession. See Whitley v. Texaco, Inc., 434 So. 2d 96
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1983) (on rehearing); Gilmore v. Schenck, 115 La. 386,
398,39 So. 40,44 (La. 1905). However, the counterarguments are equally
strong. Otherwise, the effectiveness of constructive possession would
be confined to cases where the constructively possessed land has either
been abandoned by the previous possessor or has never been possessed -
at least since the repeal of the rule providing that civil possession could
only last for ten years. See infra note 30.
(3) Same facts as (2) except that A continues to possess corporeally
only the Southwest quarter, whereas B, who had entered into posses-
sion of the Northeast quarter subsequent to A, ceased possessing cor-
poreally more than a year thereafter, again without abandoning his
possession. The problem is who is entitled to the possession of the North-
east quarter. The odds are clearly in favor of B due to his continuing
civil possession, but one wonders whether such possession should prevail
over A's current constructive possession. To offer solutions to the above
problems is not only beyond the scope of this article but is also outside
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that is included within the
boundaries.27
Art. 3498. Extent of possession
When a person has a title and
possession conformably to it, he is
presumed to possess according to
the title and to the full extent of
its limits.
Art. 3503. Restriction as to
extent of possession
How favorable soever pre-
scription may be, it shall be
restricted within just limits. Thus,
in the prescription of thirty years,
which is acquired without title, it
extends only to that which has
been actually possessed by the
person pleading it.
Art. 3431. Retention of possession; Art. 3429. Civil possession,
civil possession definition
Once acquired, possession is Possession is civil when a per-
retained by the intent to possess sons [person] ceases to reside in
as owner even if the possessor the house or on the land which he
ceases to possess corporeally. occupied, or ceases to detain the
This is civil possession. movable which he possessed, but
the role of this author, since such problems ultimately depend on policy
determinations which more appropriately rest with the legislature.
27. The word "boundaries" in OA 3437 has been interpreted by
numerous dicta and a few holdings, see, e.g., Souther v. Domingue,
238 So. 2d 264 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 256 La. 891, 239 So.
2d 544 (1970), as including natural enclosures, in addition to artificial
enclosures or boundaries established by title. Thus, even in the absence
of title, corporeal possession of a part of land enclosed by natural
boundaries could serve as possession of the whole. Comment (d) to
NA 3426 sanctions this phenomenon and considers it a kind of cor-
poreal rather than constructive possession. Because of this, the open-
ing statement of the comment that "[iln the absence of title, there
is no constructive possession" is accurate.
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without intending to abandon the
possession.'
Art. 3431. Civil possession as
owner holding by virtue of
just title
Civil possession, on the con-
trary, is defined in this sense, to
be the detention of a thing by vir-
tue of a just title, and under the
conviction of possessing as
owner.
29
Art. 3442. Preservation of an
acquired possession by
intent only
When a person has once ac-
quired possession of a thing by the
corporal detention of it, the inten-
tion which he has of possessing,
suffices to preserve the possession
in him, although he may have
ceased to have the thing in actual
custody, either himself or by
others.
Art. 3432. Presumption of Art. 3443. Presumed intent to
retention of possession retain possession
The intent to retain posses- This intention of retaining
sion is presumed unless there is possession is always supposed,
clear proof of a contrary inten- where a contrary intention does
tion." not appear decidedly; so that,
28. (Emphasis added). The italicized phrase in OA 3429 is not
reproduced in NA 3431, but is included in the comments. This is im-
portant because the lack of an intent to abandon possession is what
distinguishes civil possession from abandonment of possession. See 1
A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 26, S 211-212.
29. Old article 3431 is suppressed for the same good reasons that
OA 3430 is suppressed. See supra note 25.
30. Despite its brevity, NA 3432 incorporates the substance of
OA 3443-3444 and possibly OA 3501-3502. The only change consists
1983]
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although a person may have aban-
doned the cultivation of his estate,
he shall not therefore be presumed
to have abandoned the possession,
but shall be presumed on the con-
trary to have the intention of re-
taining it, and shall retain it in
fact.
Art. 3444. Retention of posses-
sion; loss of possession
To retain the possession of a
thing when a man once has it, it
is not even necessary that he
should have such positive inten-
tion; a negative intention suffices,
that is, it suffices that the positive
intention, which he had in acquir-
ing the possession, shall not have
been revoked by a contrary inten-
in deleting the italicized phrase in OA 3444. This means that the
(rebuttable) presumption that the possessor intends to retain posses-
sion is no longer subject to a maximum duration of ten years. In the
absence of proof of contrary intention, such as proof of abandonment,
this presumption may last forever. Thus, like ownership, see supra
note 24, and unlike real rights less than full ownership, see NA 3448,
OA 3529-3530, possession is not lost by nonuse by the possessor, but
only by adverse exercise by another or by abandonment. In theoretical
terms, this means that possession has been elevated to a higher status
(i.e., closer to ownership) in the hierarchy of property rights. (Inciden-
tally, the theoretical dispute as to whether or not possession is a real
right has plagued the civilian literature for a long time. The prevail-
ing view, also espoused by the Louisiana Civil Code in OA 3434 para.
2 and NA 3422, is that possession is a state of fact from which stems
a bundle of rights.) In practical terms the change means that, if the
article applies retroactively, as it probably would, now all land in Loui-
siana is at least civilly possessed as long as it has been possessed
corporeally even once in the remote past. The fact that, as the com-
ments suggest, see NA 3432, comment (c), the italicized phrase in OA
3444 was not squarely applied by Louisiana courts tends to diminish
the significance of this change. For additional discussion of the change,
see Note, supra note 4, at 1087.
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tion; for, so long as this revocation
does not take place, the possessor
is supposed always to retain his
first intention, unless a third per-
son has usurped or taken from him
the possession, or he has failed to
exercise an actual possession for
ten years."
Art. 3501. Preservation of
possession once acquired
The possession necessary for
this species of prescription, when
it has commenced by the corporal
possession of the thing, may, if it
has not been interrupted, be
preserved by external and public
signs, announcing the possessor's
intention to preserve the posses-
sion of the thing, as the keeping
up of roads and levees, the pay-
ment of taxes, and other similar
acts.
Art. 3502. Vestiges of works or
house as preserving
possession
A man may even retain the
civil possession of an estate, suffi-
cient to prescribe, so long as there
remain on it any vestiges of works
erected by him, as, for example,
the ruins of a house.3
31. (Emphasis added).
32. Old articles 3501-3502 are not reproduced by the new Act,
either at this point or among the articles on the thirty-year prescrip-
tion. Although the comments are silent on the issue, and although
the concordance table incorrectly cites NA 3486 as the article replac-
ing OA 3501-3502, there appears to be good reason for suppressing
these two articles: If they are taken to mean that one must manifest
his intent to retain possession by "public signs . . . as the keeping
up of roads and levees, the payment of taxes, and other similar acts"
1983]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
NEW LAW OLD LAW
PRECARIOUS POSSESSION33
Art. 3428. Acquisition of Art. 3438. Possession acquired
possession through another through others
One may acquire possession One may acquire possession of
of a thing through another who a thing, not only by himself, but
takes it for him and in his name. also through others who received
The person taking possession it for him and in his name. But in
must intend to do so for another.3 4  this case it is necessary that the
person receiving the possession
should have had intention of
receiving for the other.
or by "vestiges of works erected by him," then these articles would
be in direct conflict with the very definition of civil possession under
NA 3431, OA 3429 and 3442, as the retention of possession by intent
alone, without or rather regardless of any physical activity or vestiges
thereof. If, on the other hand, OA 3501-3502 are simply examples of
how corporeal possession is maintained, then they are superfluous.
Either way their deletion from the new Act is entirely justified:
33. The articles of the old law dealing with precarious posses-
sion were spread out in three different parts of the Code and were
quite repetitive. They could be found in the chapter on possession,
OA 3433, 3441, 3445-3446; in the subsection on the ten-year acquisitive
prescription, OA 3489-3490; and in the subsection on the causes which
prevent acquisitive prescription, OA 3510-3515. The new law is far
more concise but still regulates precarious possession in two different
parts of the Code, first in the title on possession, NA 3428-3429,
3437-3440, and then in the title on prescription, NA 3477-3479. To
facilitate a synoptic treatment of the subject, the two groups of ar-
ticles are treated together here.
34. When a lessee takes possession of more land than his lessor's
title calls for, two questions arise in establishing and interpreting the
lessee's intent. The first question is whether the lessee had any in-
tent to possess the extra land for his lessor. The answer uniformly
given to this question is that such intent is established not by the
lessee's subjective beliefs, but rather objectively by his external acts
i.e., farming, etc. See Seven Water Holes Corp. v. Spires, 393 So. 2d
811 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 399 So. 2d 610 (La. 1981). The
second question is whether the lessee's intention is to possess for
himself or for his lessor. The answer is that he is presumed to intend
to possess for his lessor. See Cortinas v. Peters, 224 La. 9, 68 So.
2d 739 (1953). When the lessee knowingly takes possession of the ex-
tra land his intent will have to be established by appropriate evidence.
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Art. 3430. Juridical persons
A juridicial person acquires
possession through its representa-
tives.
Art. 3429. Exercise of possession
by another
Possession may be exercised
by the possessor or by another
who holds the thing for him and in
his name. Thus, a lessor possesses
through his lessee.
Art. 3439. Possession on behalf of
children and insane persons
Children and insane persons,
being incapable of exercising a
will, can not* acquire by them-
selves the possession of a thing;
but they may acquire, through the
medium of their tutor or curator,
because the will exercised by the
tutors and curators in making the
acquisition for such persons sup-
plies the defect of will under which
they labor.1
5
Art. 3440. Possession by
corporations
For the same reason corpora-
tions may, acquire the possession
of a thing, through the agency of
those who administer their affairs.
Art. 3433. Possession through
others
One may possess a thing not
only by one's self, but also by other
persons. Thus the proprietor of a
house or other tenement possesses
by his tenant, or by his farmer; the
minor, by his tutor; and, in
35. The new Act eliminates OA 3439. Although both the Exposg des
Motifs and the comments are silent on the question, the reporter's
comments to earlier drafts explain the reason for suppressing the ar-
ticle: Since "[plossession is not a juridical act but factual authority
over a thing," the acquisition of possession should not require capa-
city to enter into juridical acts. See LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE,
REVISION OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870, BOOK III, TITLE
XXIII, CHAPTER 2, Doc. No. 4-28-0, art. 9, comment (b) (Council Meeting,
May 9-10, 1980) [hereinafter cited as REVISION]. Thus, incompetents
may take possession of a thing without the intervention of their tutors
or curators. There remains, of course, the problem of whether such
incompetents possess the requisite intent to possess as owners.
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Art. 3437. Precarious possession
The exercise of possession
over a thing with the permission
of or on behalf of the owner or
possessor is precarious posses-
sion."
general, every proprietor, by the
persons who hold the thing in his
name.
Art. 3445. Obtaining and pre-
serving possession for
another
To enable one person to obtain
possession for another, it is
necessary that he should have
such intention in making the
acquisition; but in preserving the
possession for another, it is not
necessary that this intention
should continue to exist.
Thus, if a farmer who retains
an estate in the name of another,
should lose the use of reason;
although on this account he would
be incapable of exercising a will,
and consequently could not retain
the possession for and in the name
of the person who has leased it to
him, yet shall the latter retain the
possession.'
36. Article 3437 is new, but its content is very old. Although the
old law used the term precarious possession in only one out of the
fifteen articles devoted to the subject, OA 3512, the phenomenon of
possessing for another was always known as "precarious possession."
See 2 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 5 180 (7th ed. Esmein
1961) in J. MAYDA, 2 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 92 (1966).
37. The content of the first sentence of OA 3445 is found in NA
3428. The new Act eliminates the rest of OA 3445 probably as an
unnecessary illustration. Indeed the principles expressed in NA
3438-3439 seem ample enough to encompass the minor or specific rule
of OA 3445. In other words, if the precarious possessor's hostile in-
tent to possess for himself is ineffective in terminating the lessor's
possession without actual notice to the lessor, the mere lack of intent
to possess on the part of the precarious possessor, e.g., because of
insanity, also should not terminate the lessor's possession.
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Art. 3438. Presumption of pre- Art. 3446. Mere change of inten-
cariousness tion of precarious possessor
A precarious possessor, such Even if a person who com-
as a lessee or a depositary, is menced his possession of an estate
presumed to possess for another for another, should entertain the
although he may intend to possess intention of no longer holding for
for himself. 8  that other, but for himself, yet
shall he still be presumed to hold
possession for the person for
whom he originally took it.
38. The presumption is rebuttable, NA 3438, comment (b). The
same was true under the old law, as can be seen by reading together
OA 3446 and 3489 ("unless there be proof to the contrary"), both of
which are cited by the comments as the sources of NA 3438. A ques-
tion not clearly answered by the text of the old law was whether
the presumption could be rebutted by any contrary proof or only by
proof of the kind of acts provided for in OA 3512. In other words,
was OA 3512 an illustration of, rather than a restriction on, the general
principle of OA 3489? Read literally, OA 3512 required that "the cause
of . . . possession [be] changed by the act of a third person," thus
excluding by implication cases where the precarious possessor changed
the nature of his possession by his own act. The same conclusion is
reached by reading OA 3512 together with OA 3514-3515, except
perhaps for the last phrase in OA 3515-"or that he has acquired
it without title by thirty years' possession." The jurisprudence has
taken the view that precarious possessors other than co-owners may
change the nature of their possession without "the act of a third per-
son" provided that they manifest to the world and the possessor by
overt and unambiguous acts their intent to possess for themselves.
See, e.g., Humble v. Dewey, 215 So. 2d 378 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
The question of whether co-owners, as well, could convert their
precarious possession into possession proper without the act of a third
party was not definitively resolved by the jurisprudence because, to
this author's knowledge, all litigated cases involved an act of a third
person. See, e.g., Towles v. Heirs of Morrison, 428 So. 2d 1029 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1983); Minton v. Whitworth, 393 So. 2d 294 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1980); Dupuis v. Broadhurst, 213 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 252 La. 967, 215 So. 2d 131 (1968) (co-owner acquired the
part that he possessed precariously through a partition with another
party).
The new law, NA 3438-3439, 3478, confirms the jurisprudence
in many ways but may be changing the law in at least one way. (1)
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Art. 3439. Termination of pre-
carious possession
A co-owner, or his universal
successor, commences to possess
for himself when he demonstrates
this intent by overt and unambigu-
ous acts sufficient to give notice
to his co-owner.
Any other precarious posses-
sor, or his universal successor,
commences to possess for himself
when he gives actual notice of this
intent to the person on whose
behalf he is possessing.
OLD LAW
Art. 3489. Possession com-
menced for another
When a person's possession
commenced for another, it is sup-
posed to continue always under
the same title, unless there be
proof to the contrary.
The new law confirms the jurisprudence by acknowledging that a
distinction ought to be drawn between co-owners and other precarious
possessors. See Dunham v. Nixon, 371 So. 2d 1288 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1979); Thomas v. Congregation of St. Sauveur Roman Catholic Church,
308 So. 2d 337 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975); Succession of Zebriska, 119
La. 1076, 44 So. 893 (1907). (2) It also confirms the jurisprudence which
allows precarious possessors who are not co-owners to change the
nature of their possession without the act of a third person. See Loui-
siana Highway Comm'n v. Raxsdale, 12 So. 2d 631 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1943); Succession of Zebriska. (3) The new Act may be changing the
law (depending on how one interprets the old law and the
jurisprudence) by also allowing co-owners to change the nature of their
possession without the act of a third person. See NA 3439 para. 1
and the first sentence of NA 3478 para. 1. The phrasing of the sec-
ond sentence of NA 3478 para. 1 clearly suggests that "[tihe acquisi-
tion and recordation of a title from a person other than a co-owner"
is simply one way, but not the only way, in which the co-owner's
possession may be converted from precarious possession to posses-
sion as owner. (4) The new Act changes the law by imposing a less
exacting burden of proof on co-owners -"overt and unambiguous acts
sufficient to give notice" - than it imposes on other precarious
possessors -"actual notice to the person on whose behalf he is possess-
ing." Again, the second sentence of NA 3478 para. 1 (in itself consis-
tent with the jurisprudence; see Towles, 428 So. 2d 1029; Dupuis, 213
So. 2d 528), which gives an example of "an overt and unambiguous




Art. 3478. Termination of pre-
carious possession; -com-
mencement of prescription
A co-owner, or his universal
successor, may commence to
prescribe when he demonstrates
by overt and unambiguous acts
sufficient to give notice to his co-
owner that he intends to possess
the property for himself. The
acquisition and recordation of a
title from a person other than a
co-owner thus may mark the com-
mencement of prescription.
Any other precarious posses-
sor, or his universal successor,
may commence to prescribe when
he gives actual notice to the per-
son on whose behalf he is possess-
ing that he intends to possess for
himself.
OLD LAW




Notwithstanding what is said
in the two preceding articles,
precarious possessors and their
heirs may prescribe when the
cause of their possession is changed
by the act of a third person; as
if a farmer, for example, acquires
from another the estate which he
rented. For if he refuse afterwards
to pay the rent, if he declare to
the lessor that he will no longer
hold the estate under him, but that
he chooses to enjoy it as his own,
this will be a change of possession
by an external act, which shall suf-
fice to give a beginning to the
prescription.
law does not require co-owners, as distinguished from other precarious
possessors, to give actual notice of their intent to possess for
themselves. The question then is why other precarious possessors are
required to give actual notice. Despite some contrary dicta, the
jurisprudence does not seem to this author to require actual notice.
See Thompson's Succession v. Cyprian, 34 So. 2d 285 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1948); Succession of Zebriska, 119 La. 1076, 44 So. 893.
More importantly, it appears a questionable policy to impose a less
exacting standard on co-owners than on other precarious possessors. If
any differentiation between co-owners and other precarious possessors
was felt necessary, it should be the other way around. Because the
adverse activities of a co-owner are less likely to arouse the suspicion
of the other co-owners than are the adverse activities of a lessee, it might
have been more appropriate to impose on such co-owners the require-
ment of "actual notice." See Note, supra note 4, at 1092, for further discus-
sion. One way to resolve the difference, short of legislative correction,
is to read "actual notice" as meaning something less (i.e., constructive
notice) than what the term usually means.
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Art. 3514. Prescription against
one's own title
One cannot prescribe against
his own title,39 in this sense, that
he can not change by his own act
the nature and the origin of his
possession.
Thus, he whose possession is
founded on a contract of lease
which is adduced, is considered as
always possessing by the same ti-
tle, and can not prescribe by any
length of time.
Art. 3515. Prescription beyond
Title
The rule, contained in the pre-
ceding article, is to be understood
in this sense, that a man can not
prescribe against an essential part
of the contract.
Thus the creditor on an
annuity can not prescribe against
the right of redemption; but one
may prescribe beyond his title.
So also, a person who has a ti-
39. Old article 3514 para. 1 provided that "[olne cannot prescribe
against his title." This principle sounded more important than it
actually was, given the great number of exceptions to which it was
subject. To begin with, the Code itself recognizes in at least three
instances that one may prescribe beyond his title. See OA 3515 para.
2, UA 760, 794. Secondly, the Code has also recognized that one may
prescribe against his title when he acquires and records a second title
from a third person. See OA 3512, 3515 para. 3. Thirdly, the
jurisprudence has recognized that a person such as a lessee may
prescribe against his lease by repudiating it and manifesting by overt
and unambiguous acts his intent to possess for himself. See Humble
v. Dewey, 215 So. 2d 378 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). In view of all these
exceptions, the principle of OA 3514 para. 1 was of doubtful validity




NEW LAW OLD LAW
Art. 3477. Precarious possessor;
inability to prescribe
Acquisitive prescription does
not run in favor of a precarious
possessor or his universal suc-
cessor.
tle for one half an estate, may
prescribe for the other half; for it
may be that a new title has
transferred the ownership of the
property to him, or that he has ac-
quired it without title by thirty
years' possession.
Art. 3490. Precarious possession
The circumstance of having
been in possession by the permis-
sion or through the indulgence of
another person, gives neither legal
possession nor the right of
prescribing.
Thus, those who possess
precariously, that is, by having
prayed the master to let them
have the possession, do not
deprive him thereof, but, possess-
ing by his consent, they possess
for him.
Art. 3510. Precarious possessors,
inability to prescribe
Those who possess for others
and not in their own name, can not
prescribe, whatever may be the
time of their possession.
Thus, farmers, tenants, de-
positaries, usufructuaries and all
those generally who hold by a pre-
carious tenure and in the name of
the owner, can not prescribe on
the thing thus held.
Art. 3511. Heirs of precarious
possessors, inability to
prescribe
The heirs of the persons
holding under the tenures men-
tioned in the preceding article, can
not prescribe any more than those
from whom they hold such thing.
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Art. 3479. Particular successor of
precarious possessor
A particular successor of a
precarious possesssor who takes
possession under an act transla-
tive of ownership possesses for
himself, and prescription runs in
his favor from the commencement
of his possession.
4 0
Art. 3440. Protection of pre-
carious possession
Where there is a disturbance
of possession, the possessory
action is available to a precarious
possessor, such as a lessee or a de-
positary, against anyone except
the person for whom he pos-
sesses.'
OLD LAW
Art. 3513. Transferees of
precarious possessors, right
to prescribe
Those to whom tenants, de-
positaries and such other persons
having only a precarious posses-
sion, have conveyed the same by
a title capable of transferring the
ownership of property, may pre-
scribe for the same.




Those who possess, not for
themselves, but in the name of
another, as farmers, depositaries
and others who acknowledge an
owner, can not acquire the legal
possession, because, at the com-
mencement of their possession,
they had not the intention of
possession for themselves but for
another.
40. New article 3479 reproduces without substantive change the
content of OA 3513 but clarifies two matters that were inartfully
expressed in the old article. (1) By substituting the word "ownership"
for the word "same," see OA 3513, NA 3479 makes it abundantly clear
that the article is meant to apply only to cases where the precarious
possessor conveyed the property itself, not just his right in the prop-
erty. See NA 3479, comments (b), (d). (2) By using the phrase "prescrip-
tion runs in his favor from the commencement of his possession" (em-
phasis added), NA 3479 also makes it clear that the transferee of the
precarious possessor may not tack the possession of his transferor.
See NA 3479, comment (c).
41. Because the precarious possessor did not have "legal posses-
sion" under the old law, see OA 3441, he was not entitled to the
possessory action. (However, at least one Louisiana decision gave him
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Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
Art. 3656 1para. 11. Same; parties; venue
A plaintiff in a possessory action shall be one who possesses for
himself. A person entitled to the use or usufruct of immovable proper-
ty, and one who owns a real right therein, possesses for himself. A
predial lessee possesses for and in the name of his lessor, and not for
himself.
injunctive relief under La. Code Civ. P. art. 3663(2). See Indian Bayou
Hunting Club, Inc. v. Taylor, 261 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972)).
This principle is expressly stated in LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3656, which
requires that the plaintiff in a possessory action be "one who possesses
for himself." While under that article a usufructuary or a person
having a predial servitude "possesses for himself," he does so only
with regard to the servitude (quasi-possession). With regard to the
land itself, he is possessing precariously for the naked owner or for
the owner of the servient estate. The servitude owner could bring
a possessory action in his own name against someone interfering with
his quasi-possession of the servitude but not against someone disturb-
ing his precarious possession of the rest of the land. By the same
token, a lessee could not bring a possessory action against a usurper
of his precarious possession but would instead have to call his lessor
in warranty.
To avoid this duplication of effort, the new Act changes the law by
making the possessory action available to a precarious possessor against
anyone except the person for whom he possesses. The judgment rendered
in such a possessory action will not be res judicata against the person
on whose behalf the precarious possessor possesses, unless the latter
was made a party to the proceeding. The comments say that NA 3440
does not purport to modify in any way UA 2704 and that in cases falling
under the article "the lessee is bound to call the lessor in warranty."
(Emphasis added). This statement may well mean that the granting of
the possessory action to the lessee is really a specious gift, since UA
2704 applies to all cages in which the person with whom the lessee is
feuding claims "a right to the thing leased" and thus is to be distinguished
from a mere trespasser.
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OTHER ATTRIBUTES OR VICES OF POSSESSION4 2
Art. 3435. Vices of Possession
Possession that is violent,
clandestine, discontinuous, or
equivocal has no legal effect.
Art. 3487. Attributes of posses-
sion for ten-year prescription
To enable one to plead the
prescription treated of in this
paragraph, it is necessary that the
possession be distinguished by the
following incidents:
1. That the possessor shall
have held the thing in fact and in
right, as owner; 3 when, however,
it is only necessary to complete a
possession already begun, the civil
possession shall suffice, provided
it has been preceded by the cor-
poral possession.
2. That the possession shall
have been continuous and uninter-
rupted, peaceable, public and une-
quivocal; a clandestine possession
would give no right to prescribe;
but he who possesses by virtue of
a title can not be considered as a
clandestine possessor, for his title
leads to the supposition that the
possession commenced in good
faith, and that is sufficient to
enable him to plead prescription.
42. Although the old law defined the attributes of possession only
for purposes of prescription, there was never any question that those
same attributes were necessary in order for possession to have any
other legal effect, including the protection of the possessory action.
See Liner v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 319 So. 2d 766 (La.
1975). Following this line of thinking, the new law defines all the at-
tributes of possession in the title dealing with possession and then
refers to those same attributes as being necessary for prescription.
See NA 3476, 3488.
43. See NA 3424 for the corresponding requirement under the
new law.





Art. 3436. Violent, clandestine,
discontinuous, and equivocal
possession
Possession is violent when it
is acquired or maintained by
violent acts. When the violence
ceases, the possession ceases to be
violent.
Possession is clandestine
when it is not open or public,
discontinuous when it is not
exercised at regular intervals, and
equivocal when there is ambiguity
as to the intent of the possessor to
own the thing.'"
OLD LAW
Art. 3491. Possession by violence
A possession by violence, not
being legal, does not confer the
right of prescribing.'5
That right only commences
when the violence has ceased.
RIGHTS OF POSSESSORS; PROTECTION OF POSSESSION
Art. 3434 [para. 21. Possession
linked to ownership; posses-
sion implies a right and a
fact
Thus, possession implies a
right and a fact; the right to enjoy
annexed to the right of ownership,
45. Under the old law, it was arguable that a possession that
began peacefully but was later maintained by violence was not violent.
"Possession is marred by violence . . . if it was acquired and con-
tinued by acts accompanied by physical or psychological violence." 2
C. AUBRY & C. RAu, supra note 36, S 180, at 98 (emphasis added). "If
the possession originates peacefully, it does not become defective if
troubles . .. are caused by third persons." Id. at 98 n.32; cf. 1 M.
PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 2, no. 2278 (12th ed. La. St. L. Inst.
trans. 1959). The above excerpts from the translations of Aubry and
Rau were quoted with approval by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Liner, 319 So. 2d at 776. Although the comments are silent on the
issue, NA 3436 brings a change in the law when it states that "[p]osses-
sion is violent when it is acquired or maintained by violent acts."
(Emphasis added).
46. For a good recent example of equivocal possession, see City
of New Orleans v. New Orleans Canal, Inc., 412 So. 2d 975 (La. 1982).
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and the fact of the real detention
of the thing that is in the hands
of the master or of another for
him.
Art. 3422. Nature of possession; Art. 3450. Rights of possessors
right to possess Although possession results
Possession is a matter of fact; frequently from a fact, and not
nevertheless, one who has from right, it nevertheless confers
possessed a thing for over a year on the possessor certain rights
acquires the right to possess it."7  with regard to the thing
possessed, some of which are
peculiar to the possessor in good
faith, and the others are common
to all possessors."8
47. The term "right to possess" is a new term of art signifying
the right of a possessor to be protected by the possessory action.
This right comes into existence the moment a possessor who meets
all the other qualifications completes one year of possession. At that
same moment, the previous possessor who has been out of possession
for one year loses his right to possess. See Justice Tat6's concurrence
in the denial of rehearing in Liner, 319 So. 2d at 779. The new term
does not entail a substantive change in the law. Cf. OA 3453(2), 3455,
LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3658(2).
In some cases, however, possessory protection is accorded a
possessor who has not yet completed one full year of possession, such
as when he was evicted by force or fraud. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art.
3658(2). Similarly, a possessor's right to the fruits, UA 486, his right
to remove improvements made on the land of another or to be reim-
bursed for them, UA 496-497, and his right to be reimbursed for useful
or necessary expenses, UA 527, 529, do not depend on the length of
his possession but rather on his good or bad faith.
48. The good or bad faith of the possessor is relevant only for
purposes of accession and acquisitive prescription. See UA 486, 497;
NA 3475, 3490. Good or bad faith is immaterial for purposes of the
possessory action. See the italicized language in LA. CODE CIV. P. art.
3660, infra text accompanying note 58. Accordingly, the new law




Art. 3423. Rights of possessors
A possessor is considered pro-
visionally as owner of the thing he
possess until the right of the true
owner is established.
Art. 529 Right of retention
The possessor whether in
good or in bad faith, may retain
possession of the thing until he is
reimbursed for expenses and im-
provements which he is entitled
to claim. 1
Art. 3444. Possessory action
Possession of immovables is
protected by the possessory
action, as provided in Articles
OLD LAW
Art. 3454. Rights common to all
possessors
Rights, which are common to
all possessors in good or bad
faith, are that:
1. They are considered provi-
sionally as owners of the thing
which they possess, so long as it
is not reclaimed by the true
owner or person entitled to
reclaim it, and, even after such
reclamation, until the right of the
person making it is established.
3. Such a possessor may, by
prescription, acquire the owner-
ship of the thing which he thus
possesses, after a certain time,
which is established by law
according as he has possessed in
good or bad faith.49
4. Such a possessor has the
right, in case of eviction from the
thing reclaimed, to retain it until
he is reimbursed the expenses he
is entitled to claim.'
2. Every person who has
possessed an estate for a year, or
enjoys peaceably and without in-
terruption a real right, and is
49. The substance of this paragraph is incorporated into NA 3446,
3475, 3486, 3490-3491.
50. The substance of this paragraph was already incorporated into
UA 529 as enacted by Act 180 of 1979.
51. Added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 180, S 1.
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3655 through 3671 of the Code of disturbed in it, has an action
Civil Procedure.5 2  against the disturber, either to
Possession of movables is pro- be maintained in his possession,
tected by the rules of the Code of or to be restored to it, in case of
Civil Procedure that govern civil eviction, whether by force or
actions.58  otherwise.'
Art. 3455. Possessory action
The action which a possessor
for one year has against a per-
son disturbing his possession, to
be maintained in it or restored to
it, as is said in the preceding
article, shall be decided before
pronouncing on the question of
ownership, and the real owner
shall not be allowed to repel it
by endeavoring to prove his
right.55
Art. 3456. Prescription of
possessory action
But this, which is called the
possessory action, must be com-
menced by the possessor within
a year, reckoning from the time
52. The Code of Civil Procedure duplicated the articles of the
Civil Code of 1870 dealing with the possessory action. See, e.g., OA
3454(2), 3455-3456. Rather than maintaining this duplication, the new
Act correctly deletes those articles and refers expressly to the Code
of Civil Procedure. No substantive change results.
53. The paragraph is a new provision but does not change the
law. It was placed in the article in order to make clear that, although
not governed by LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3658-3671 which are applicable
only to immovables, the possession of movables is also protected by
an innominate civil action. See NA 3444, comment (b).
54. The substance of the paragraph is incorporated into NA 3422
and 3444, and LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3655 and 3658.
55. The substance of the article can be found in LA. CODE CIV.
P. arts. 3657-3658 and 3661.
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when he was disturbed;' for if he
leaves the person evicting him in
possession for one year, without
complaint, he shall lose his
possession, whatever apparent
right he may have had to it,57 and
shall be driven to his action for
the ownership of the property.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
Art. 3658. Same; requisites
To maintain the possessory action the possessor must allege and
prove that:
(1) He had possession of the immovable property or real right therein
at the time the disturbance occurred;
(2) He and his ancestors in title had such possession quietly and
without interruption for more than a year immediately prior to the distur-
bance, unless evicted by force or fraud;
(3) The disturbance was one in fact or in law, as defined in Article
3659; and
(4) The possessory action was instituted within a year of the distur-
bance.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
Art. 3660 Ipara. II. Same;
possession
A person is in possession of immovable property or of a real right
therein, within the intendment of the articles of this Chapter, when
he has the corporeal possession thereof, or civil possession thereof pre-
ceded by corporeal possession by him or his ancestors in title, and pos-
sesses for himself, whether in good or bad faith, or even as a usurper ....
56. The substance of the clause can be found in LA. CODE CIV.
P. art. 3658(4).
57. The substance of the clause is reproduced in NA 3434.
58. (Emphasis added).
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Loss OF POSSESSION; LOSS OF THE RIGHT TO POSSESS;59 INTERRUPTION
OF POSSESSION; INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION
Art. 3447. Loss of possession
Possession of a thing may be
lost either with or without the con-
sent of the possessor.0
Art. 3448. Loss with consent of
possessor
Possession is lost with the con-
sent of the possessor:
59. The distinction between loss of possession and loss of the right
to possess was implicit in the old law. Compare OA 3448, 3449(1) with
OA 3449(2), 3454(2). This distinction was articulated by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Liner, 319 So. 2d at 774-76 and is now codified in
NA 3433-3434. A possessor who is evicted loses his possession at the
moment of the eviction, but does not lose his right to possess until
one year after the eviction (and only if in the meantime he did not
recover it or did not file a possessory action). At this latter point
the usurper will acquire the right to possess. In order to be entitled
to the possessory action, the plaintiff must show uninterrupted posses-
sion "for more than a year immediately prior to the disturbance." LA.
CODE CIV. P. art. 3658(2). Possession is uninterrupted when the
possessor did not lose the right to possess although he might have
lost possession. Thus in a possessory action for a disturbance which
occurred on January 1, 1983, the plaintiff must show that he did not
lose the right to possess during the year 1982. He will be able to
do so even if he was evicted for a period of less than twelve months
during 1982, or even if he was evicted for more than a year before
1982 but recovered possession on January 2, 1982 and held it until
January 1, 1983. See Liner, 319 So. 2d at 779 (Tate, J., concurring).
Thus, "interruption of possession" becomes. another term of art
synonymous with "loss of the right to possess." Except for cases of
abandonment (see the first sentence of NA 3434, infra note 62) posses-
sion is interrupted for purposes of the possessory action, NA 3434,
as well as for purposes of prescription, NA 3465, only when the right
to possess is lost.
60. The new law does not officially recognize this didactic distinc-
tion, but abandonment remains an instance in which possession is lost
with the possessor's consent. See NA 3433.
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1. When he transfers this
possession to another with the in-
tention to divest himself of it. 1
2. When he does some act,
which manifests his intention of
abandoning possession, as when a
man throws into the street fur-
niture, or clothes, of which he no
longer chooses to make use."2
61. This provision is not reproduced in the new law under the
heading "loss of possession" "because a transfer of possession is not
a loss of possession. It is true that the possessor ceases to possess,
but his possession is continued by the transferee who benefits by tack-
ing." NA 3433, comment (b). The statement is certainly correct and,
coupled with NA 3441 which states in affirmative terms that "[plosses-
sion is transferable," may have some implications as to the continu-
ing vitality of Bartlett v. Calhoun, 412 So. 2d 597 (La. 1982), discussed
infra notes 65, 70.
62. The content of the paragraph, without the illustrations, is
reproduced in NA 3433. Unlike eviction, upon abandonment the
resulting loss of possession, NA 3433, coincides in time with the loss
of the right to possess (see the first sentence of NA 3434), and posses-
sion is interrupted immediately. See NA 3434 para. 2. This means that,
even before the lapse of a year from the abandonment, the abandon-
ing possessor cannot bring the possessory action against a person who
had taken possession in the meantime, even though the latter has
not as yet himself acquired the right to possess. It also means that
if the abandoning possessor somehow regains possession within the
year, he begins a new possession. Obviously then, the abandoning
possessor is treated much less favorably than the evicted possessor,
who does not lose the right to possess and whose possession is not
interrupted unless he stays out of possession for a full year. See the
second sentence of NA 3434.
Abandonment also interrupts prescription. Although OA 3517 was
silent on the issue, there was never any question that prescription
was interrupted by abandonment. See NA 3465 comment (b). The only
question is whether, like possession, prescription, too, is interrupted
immediately upon abandonment. It would seem so at least by parity
of reasoning, and the comments agree by stating that "[w]hen a
possessor abandons possession . . . acquisitive prescription is inter-
rupted upon the loss of possession." NA 3465, comment (c) (emphasis
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Art. 3433. Loss of possession
Possession is lost when the
possessor manifests his intention
to abandon it or when he is evicted
by another by force or usurpation.
Art. 3434. Loss of the right to
possess
The right to possess is lost
upon abandonment of possession.
In case of eviction, the right to
possess is lost if the possessor
does not recover possession within
a year of the eviction.
When the right to possess is
lost, possession is interrupted.
OLD LAW
Art. 3449. Loss without consent
of possessor
A possessor of an estate loses
the possession against his consent:
1. When another expels him
from it, whether by force in driv-
ing him away, or by usurping
possession during his absence, and
preventing him from re-entering.
2. When the possessor of an
estate allows it to be usurped and
held for a year, without, during
that time, having done any act of
possession, or interfered with the
usurper's possession.
Art. 3456. Prescription of
possessory action
But this, which is called the
possessory action, must be com-
menced by the possessor within a
year, reckoning from the time
when he was disturbed; for if he
added). However, there is reason to doubt whether the language .of
NA 3465 is precise enough to support this otherwise correct idea.
Unlike either its counterpart provision, NA 3434 ("[iun case of evic-
tion"), or OA 3517 ("when the possessor is deprived"), the language
of the second paragraph of NA 3465 is broad enough to encompass
cases where the loss of possession results from abandonment. To
rectify the problem, one would have to either rephrase the second
paragraph of NA 3465 in more narrow terms or, better yet, eliminate
the paragraph altogether and reword the first paragraph as follows:
"Acquisitive prescription is interrupted when the right of possession
is lost," or "acquisitive prescription is interrupted when possession
is interrupted."
63. As Liner, 319 So. 2d 766, made clear, section (1) of OA 3449
addressed loss of possession, as distinguished from the loss of the
right to possess addressed in section (2) of the same article and also
in OA 3456 and 3517. The substance of OA 3449(1) is now incorporated
in NA 3433. The substance of OA 3449(2) and 3456 is now incorporated
in NA 3434. The substance of OA 3517 reappears in NA 3465.
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Art. 3465. Interruption of
acquisitive prescription
Acquisitive prescription is in-
terrupted when possession is lost.
The interruption is considered
never to have occurred if the
possessor recovers possession
within one year or if he recovers
possession later by virtue of an ac-
tion brought within the year."
leaves the person evicting him in
possession for one year, without
complaint, he shall lose his posses-
sion, whatever apparent right he
may have had to it, and shall be
driven to his action for the owner-
ship of the property.
Art. 3517. Natural interruption
by physical deprivation
A natural interruption is said
to take place when the possessor
is deprived of the possession of the
thing during more than a year,
either by the ancient proprietor
or even by a third person.
TRANSFER OF POSSESSION: TACKING OF POSSESSION 5
Art. 3441. Transfer of possession
Possession is transferable by
Art. 3448 IS 11. Loss with consent
of possessor
64. Although it sounds self-evident, the phrase "or if he recovers
later by virtue of an action brought within the year" should also
appear in NA 3434.
65. Tacking of possession may be necessary either for purposes
of the possessory action or for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
Accordingly, the new law treats both kinds of tacking together in
a single article, NA 3442.
(1) For purposes of the possessory action, a person will need tack-
ing if he has been in corporeal possession for less than a year or if
he has only civil possession of his own, whether for more or less than
a year. In the first situation, tacking of his possession to that of his
ancestor in title will make up the one year of possession (right to
possess) which is necessary for the possessory action. See LA. CODE
Civ. P. art. 3658(2). In the second situation, tacking will enable the
possessor to obtain the benefit of his ancestor's corporeal possession
in order to meet the requirement that "possession must be corporeal
at the beginning." This latter kind of tacking was recognized in Ellis
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v. Prevost, 19 La. 251 (1841) and has been codified in LA. CODE CIV.
P. art. 3660, see italicized language infra text accompanying note 69.
The new law does not disturb the holding of Ellis.
(2) For purposes of acquisitive prescription, tacking will be
employed in a number of situations as shown in the following illustra-
tions. G indicates a possessor in good faith; B indicates a possessor
in bad faith; the person second in line is a successor by particular
title of the person first in line; the number in parenthesis indicates
the year each person entered into possession.
(a) G1 (1960) + G2 (1967): G2 prescribed in 1970.
(b) B1 (1960) + B2 (1967): B2 will prescribe in 1990.
(c) B (1960) + G (1967): G prescribed in 1977 without tacking.
(d) B (1960) + G (1983): G will prescribe in 1990 with tacking.
(e) G (1960) + B (1967): Under Devall v. Chopin, 15 La. 566
(1840), B would have prescribed by 1970. Under Bartlett v.
Calhoun, 412 So. 2d 597 (La. 1982), B will not prescribe until
1990.
In all of the above situations, a different kind of tacking may also
be involved: if the person second in line had only civil possession,
he will be permitted to tack his ancestor's corporeal possession in
order to meet the requirement that "possession . . . be corporeal at
the beginning." Ellis held so only in the context of a possessory ac-
tion, but the permissibility of this kind of tacking in the context of
prescription has never been questioned. Although Bartlett did not in-
volve this issue, the opinion contained broad enough language to be
construed as disallowing this kind of tacking. The reason given by
Bartlett for overruling Devall was that, unlike a universal successor,
a successor by particular title "must have all the statutory
characteristics and conditions required for the completion of prescrip-
tion" in order to benefit from tacking. If applied literally, this language
would amount to the overruling of Ellis by implication. The only
assurance of the continuing vitality of the Ellis rule is its incorpora-
tion into LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3660. However, the narrow wording of
article 3660 is in terms of possession for purposes of a possessory
action rather than for purposes of prescription. The possibility thereby
exists that a possessor who has civil but not corporeal possession will
not be allowed to tack the corporeal possession of his ancestor in ti-
tle since, under Bartlett, he does not have "all the statutory
characteristics and conditions required for . . . prescription." Fortu-
nately, however, this language was dictum and should not overrule
established jurisprudence.
Bartlett was decided shortly after the final draft of what is now
Act 187 of 1982 was approved by the Louisiana State Law Institute
and, therefore, the Institute did not have the opportunity to express




universal title or by particular
title.6
Art. 3442. Tacking of possession
The possession of the trans-
feror is tacked to that of the trans-
feree if there has been no inter-
ruption of possession.'
OLD LAW
Possession is lost with the
consent of the possessor;
1. When he transfers this
possession to another with the in-
tention to divest himself of it.
Art. 3493. Addition of possession
by author of title; tacking
The possessor is allowed to
make the sum of possession
necessary to prescribe, by adding
to his own possession that of his
author, in whatever manner he
may have succeeded him, whether
by an universal or particular, a
lucrative or an onerous title.
is presumed to be aware of the judicial interpretations of legislation
under revision, it is doubtful whether Bartlett was actually brought
to the attention of the legislators. Nevertheless, the critics of Bartlett
may find support in both the text of the new law and the accompany-
ing comments. Although the new law takes no position on Bartlett's
holding (namely that a bad faith possessor cannot tack the possession
of his good faith predecessor for purposes of the ten-year prescrip-
tion, see infra note 70), the new law does contain a mild -repudiation
of Bartlett's dictum that a possessor must have "all the statutory
characteristics" in order to benefit from tacking. By phrasing NA 3441
in more categorical terms than OA 3448(1), the new law reinforces
the argument of Bartlett's critics that whenever there is a transfer
of possession, the transferee acquires all of the transferor's rights or
inchoate rights and, therefore, has "all the statutory characteristics."
The comments also contain language to that effect. See NA 3424, com-
ment (c); NA 3433, comment (b); NA 3442, comment (b). For a thorough
discussion of Bartlett criticizing its departure from established prac-
tice, see Note, A Restricted Application of Civil Code Article 8482:
Bartlett v. Calhoun, 43 LA. L. REV. 1221 (1983).
66. The substance of the article was implicit in OA 3448 and
3493-3496. For the difference between NA 3441 and OA 3448, see supra
note 61. For the possible impact of NA 3441 on Bartlett, see supra
note 65; infra note 70.
67. Despite its brevity, NA 3442 purports to incorporate the
substance of OA 3493-3496. It succeeds for the most part by using
broader, more technical language and through its comments. For in-
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Art. 3494. Author, definition
By the word author in the
preceding article, is understood
the person from whom another
derives his right, whether by a
universal title, as by succession,
or by particular title, as by sale,
by donation, or any other title,
onerous or gratuitous.
Thus, in every species of
prescription, the possession of the
heir may be joined to that of the
ancestor, and the possession of the
buyer to that of the seller.
Art. 3495. Tacking of posses-
sions, continuity required
But to enjoy this advantage,
the different possessions must
have succeeded each other
without interval or interruption.
Art. 3496. Continuity of posses-
sions in case of succession
We do not consider as an in-
terval between two possessions,
that which takes place between
stance, the term "transferor," although not as broad as the word
"author," is more meaningful and is broad enough to encompass a
seller, a donor, or a testator. While the term cannot, in the abstract,
encompass a predecessor who died intestate, it does so in context,
i.e., when read together with NA 3441. The word "transferor" also
conveys the idea, which was also implicit in the word "author," that
there must be a "juridical link," i.e., a transfer between the two posses-
sions. The only cases in which tacking is permitted in the absence
of a "juridical link" are the cases falling under UA 794. Similarly,
the word "interruption" has the technical meaning assigned to it earlier
by NA 3434 para. 2, thus rendering OA 3495 unnecessary. Yet, one
cannot be sure that compressing four articles into a single sentence
will not result in losing some of the substance of the old law. For-
tunately, the comments fill much of the vacuum.
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the decease of the testator and the
acceptance of the succession by
the heir; the possession of the
deceased being considered in law
as continued in the person of his
heir. 8
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
Art. 3660 Ipara. 11. Same; possession
A person is in possession of immovable property or of a real right
therein, within the intendment of the articles of this Chapter, when
he has the corporeal possession thereof, or civil possession thereof
preceded by corporeal possession by him or his ancestors in title, and
possesses for himself, whether in good or bad faith, or even as a usurper. 9
Art. 3443. Presumption of
continuity of possession
One who proves that he had
possession at different times is
presumed to have possessed
during the intermediate period.
Art. 3492. Present and former
possession, presumption of
interim possession
The actual possessor, when he
proves that he has formerly been
in possession, shall be presumed
also to have been in possession in
the intermediate time.
68. The deletion of the article by the new Act does not entail
a change in the law because the content of OA 3496 is found in other
articles of the Civil Code pertaining to successions. See UA 942-948.
In fact, because of these articles, one should not, properly speaking,
use the term "tacking" in cases of succession by universal title; in
such cases, there is only one possession which is continued by the
heirs rather than two possessions which need to be joined. See the
express language of UA 942, 943 para. 1, 945. For particular legatees,
see NA 3441, comment (b).
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Art. 3482. Good faith at Art. 3482. Good faith at
commencement of commencement of possession
prescription sufficient
It is sufficient that possession It is sufficient if the possession
has commenced in good faith; has commenced in good faith; and
subsequent bad faith does not pre- if the possession should after-
vent the accrual of prescription of wards be held in bad faith, that
ten years.' shall not prevent the prescription.
70. Old article 3482 (its successor coincidentally bears the same
number), was at the center of the dispute between the majority and
the minority opinions in Bartlett v. Calhoun, 412 So. 2d 597 (La. 1982).
The case involved the question of whether a bad faith possessor could
tack the possession of her good faith predecessor to her own posses-
sion for the purposes of ten-year acquisitive prescription. Since Devall
v. Chopin, 15 La. 566 (1840), Louisiana has been alone among civilian
systems in allowing this kind of tacking. Devall relied on an obscure
French commentator, Troplong, who represented a small minority in
French doctrinal opinion. Overruling this "erroneous" jurisprudence,
Bartlett realigned Louisiana with French law and the law of all systems
sharing the Romanist tradition. Yet, neither this realignment, nor the
stature of Planiol on which Bartlett so heavily relied, nor the inherent
equity of the result in Bartlett, should be sufficient to justify the over-
ruling of jurisprudence spanning 142 years, especially in the area of
property law, unless accompanied by a thorough analysis of the policies
militating in favor of one or the other solution and by a weighing
of the interests that may be affected by such overruling. It is beyond
the scope of this article to attempt such analysis here, but the reader
is referred to a thorough discussion of Bartlett in Note, A Restricted
Application of Civil Code Article 3482: Bartlett v. Calhoun, 43 LA. L.
REV. 1221 (1983).
According to the majority in Bartlett, OA 3482 contemplates "one
possession," i.e., a possession by one person or by that person and
his universal successors but not by his particular successors. When
the article is read in isolation, the statement is certainly correct, but
when the article is read together with the articles that allow transfer
and tacking, the answer is not as simple. The crucial question then
becomes: exactly what does the good faith possessor transfer to his
bad faith transferee? He certainly transfers the "fact" of possession
and its concomitant advantages, including the right to possess. See
supra note 65. Does he-or should he be allowed to-transfer the in-
choate rights generated by his good faith, i.e., the expectation that
in due time he will become owner? The economic dynamics of a sale
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TEN-YEAR PRESCRIPTION OF IMMOVABLES
Art. 3473. Prescription of
immovables
The ownership of immovables
is acquired by a longer or shorter
time, accordingly as the possessor
has been in good or bad faith, as
laid down in the following
paragraph.
certainly do not preclude and usually contemplate such a transfer.
Whether the legal system should also recognize this fact may ulti-
mately be a "moral" question. There is much to be said for the idea
that the shorter prescription should be reserved for the protection
of only those who at the beginning of their possession, i.e., at the
time that they suffered the economic loss, were justifiably unaware
of the defects in their acquisition. Yet, at some point, other factors
ought to enter into the picture, such as the consideration that prescrip-
tion does not only reward the possessor but is also designed to
discourage the prolonged inertia of the record owner. Perhaps, with
regard to the record owner, it should not make any difference whether
his land was possessed adversely for ten years by one good faith
possessor or by two possessors (the second of whom was in bad faith),
so long as he (the record owner) was not in possession for ten years.
The new Act does not take a position on Bartlett. The arguments
for or against Bartlett are the same under the new law as they were
under the old. If anything, the new Act contains an indirect disap-
proval which can be discerned from the phrasing of NA 3441 and the
comments. See supra notes 61, 65 and the reservations expressed
therein. In any event, that the new Act, at the least, does not con-
firm Bartlett should prove satisfactory to its critics. By not openly
taking sides on the issue, the new Act reserves to the court the op-
portunity to rethink this multifaceted problem and possibly reverse
Bartlett or confine it to its own peculiar facts. Bartlett was peculiar
in that the person seeking to tack the possession of her good faith
transferor had previously sold the land to her transferor and was
allegedly in bad faith at the time of both her purchases. These facts
alone, plus the possibility of abuse inherent in them, may justify
Bartlett more convincingly than any of the technicalities contained in
the majority opinion. Although the opinion was phrased in broader
terms than were necessary, a future court may find it advisable to
confine the holding to cases involving such "double acquisitions."
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Art. 3473. Prescription of ten
years
Ownership and other real
rights in immovables may be
acquired by the prescription of
ten years.
Art. 3474. Incompetents
This prescription runs against
Absentees and incompetents, in-
cluding minors and interdicts.17
OLD LAW
Art. 3474. Immovables, possessor
in good faith with just title
Immovables are prescribed for
by ten years, when the possessor
has been in good faith and held by
a just title during that time.
Art. 3478. Immovables, possession
in good faith with just title;
accrual of prescription against
incapables
He who acquires an im-
movable in good faith and by just
title prescribes for it in ten years.
This prescription shall run against
interdicts, absentees and all others
now excepted by law; and as to
minors this prescription shall ac-
crue and apply in nineteen years
from the date of the birth of said
minor; provided that this prescrip-
tion once it has begun to run
against a party shall not be inter-
rupted in favor of any minor heirs
of said party.
71. New article 3474 changes the law with regard to minors on
the ground that "[m]inors should occupy the same position as other
incompetents." NA 3474, comment (b). The impact of the change can
be seen in the following illustration: P has been in uninterrupted
possession of a tract of land since 1970 by virtue of a just title and
in good faith. In 1970, M, the true owner of the land, was a five-year-
old minor. Under the last sentence of OA 3478 P could not prescribe
until 1984, i.e., when M would become nineteen years old. Under NA
3474, P prescribed in 1980. For further discussion of the treatment
of minors by the new law, see infra notes 110-11. Applying NA 3474
retroactively entails serious constitutional problems which can be
resolved only by giving M an additional "reasonable period" (perhaps
a year from the enactment of the new law) within which to protect
his rights. See Reichenphader v. Allstate Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 648 (La.
1982); Lot v. Haley, 370 So. 2d 521 (La. 1979); see also Hargrave,
Developments in the Law: Louisiana Constitutional Law, 1980-1981, 42





The requisites for the
acquisitive prescription of ten
years are: possession of ten years,
good faith, just title, and a thing
susceptible of acquisition by pre-
scription.
Art. 3476. Attributes of
possession
The possessor must have cor-
poreal possession, or civil posses-
sion preceded by corporeal posses-
sion, to acquire a thing by pre-
scription.




Art. 3479. Conditions necessary
for good faith prescription
To acquire the ownership of
immovables by the species of
prescription which forms the sub-
ject of the present paragraph, four
conditions must concur:
1. Good faith on the part of
the possessor.
2. A title which shall be
legal, and sufficient to transfer the
property.
3. Possession during the
time required by law, which
possession must be accompanied
by the incidents hereafter
required.
4. And finally an object
which may be acquired by pre-
scription.
Art. 3487. Attributes of posses-
sion for ten-year prescription
To enable one to plead the
prescription treated of in this
paragraph, it is necessary that the
possession be distinguished by the
following incidents:
1. That the possessor shall
have held the thing in fact and in
right, as owner; when, however,
it is only necessary to complete a
possession already begun, the civil
possession shall suffice, provided
72. Although much more concise than its predecessor, NA 3476
incorporates, with only one exception (see infra note 73), the substance
of OA 3487. This is possible because all of the attributes of posses-
sion have already been defined in detail in the title dealing with
possession. See NA 3435-3436. The same is true for many other ar-
ticles which appeared in this section of the old Code. See, e.g., OA
3488-3496, 3498 (all of which now appear in one form or another in
the title on possession; see NA 3476 comment (h)).
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it has been preceded by the cor-
poreal possession.
2. That the possession shall
have been continuous and uninter-
rupted, peaceable, public and une-
quivocal; a clandestine possession
would give no right to prescribe;
but he who possesses by virtue of
a title can not be considered as a
clandestine possessor, for his title
leads to the supposition that the
possession commenced in good
faith," and that is sufficient to
enable him to plead prescription.
TEN-YEAR PRESCRIPTION: THE GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT
Art. 3480. Good faith, definition
The good faith, spoken of in
the preceding article, is defined
in the chapter which treats of
possession.
Art. 3480. Good faith
For purposes of acquisitive
prescription, a possessor is in good
faith when he reasonably believes,
in light of objective considerations,
that he is owner of the thing he
possesses."
Art. 3451. Possessor in good
faith, definition
The possessor in good faith
is he who has just reason to
believe himself the master of the
thing which he possesses,
although he may not be in fact;
73. This was a totally incorrect "supposition" and it has been sup-
pressed for good reason. The fact that someone possesses by virtue
of title neither guarantees nor implies his good faith. It never did.
The statement that one who possesses by virtue of title cannot be
considered a clandestine possessor is a useful principle which is
preserved in the comments. See NA 3476 comment (g).
74. Comment (a) to NA 3480 states that the article "changes the
law," but it is unclear how, or to what extent, it does so. From a
comparison of the article with its predecessor, OA 3451, and a careful
reading of the comments, two changes emerge: (1) Good faith and just
title are disassociated and (2) good faith is to be determined on the
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as happens to him who buys a
thing which he supposes to
belong to the person selling it to
him, but which, in fact, belongs
to another.
basis of completely objective criteria. Even under OA 3451, there
should have been no question that the existence of good faith was
to be determined in the light of objective considerations- "just reason
to believe." However, in dealing with the requirement of just title,
OA 3484 used the words "honestly believed," thus injecting a subjec-
tive element into the determination of good faith, while also confus-
ing the two analytically distinct requirements of just title and good
faith.
The new law clarifies both issues by segregating the question of just
title from that of good faith and by declaring in categorical terms that
good faith is to be determined "in light of objective considerations," NA
3480. In so doing, the new law overrules a small minority of old cases
that attributed too much significance to the possessor's subjective beliefs
in determining good faith. See NA 3480, comment (a). The movement
toward more objective criteria which is reflected in the new Act, coupled
with the abolition of the doctrine of "error of law," see infra note 75,
may have more far-reaching ramifications than one might initially
suspect. According to the comments, see NA 3480, comment (d); NA 3481,
comment (e), the revision "does not affect the public records doctrine."
This is true in the sense that the new Act does not purport to affect
directly the public records doctrine. However, through its emphasis on
"reasonable" and "objective" criteria, the Act has probably opened the
door for a reconsideration of the public records doctrine, as well as of
some other related jurisprudential rules.
The first such rule, not technically part of the public records doc-
trine, is the rule providing that the presumption of good faith is not
affected by the buyer's failure to conduct a title search "unless he
knew of facts sufficient to excite inquiry." See Attaway v. Culpepper,
386 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980). Whatever justification might
have existed for such a rule in nineteenth century rural Louisiana,
the rule makes little sense today, when title searches are (or should
be) standard practice in ordinary onerous transactions. An objective,
reasonable person doctrine would seem to dictate a reversal of the
old rule, so that the presumption of good faith would now depend
on whether or not the possessor's failure to conduct a title search
is reasonable. In ordinary onerous acquisitions the failure to conduct
a title search ought to be seriously considered by the court, unless
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Art. 3452. Possessor in bad faith,
definition
The possessor in bad faith is
he who possesses as master, but
who assumes this quality, when
he well knows that he has no ti-
tle to the thing, or that his title
is vicious and defective.
Art. 3481. Presumption of good Art. 3481. Presumption of good
faith faith; burden of proving bad
Good faith is presumed. faith
Neither error of fact nor error of Good faith is always pre-
the possessor shows facts and circumstances justifying his otherwise
imprudent behavior, e.g., a bond of confidence between seller and buyer
deriving from family relationships or long friendship, the seller's long
and notorious possession, etc.
With regard to the public records doctrine proper, the extent of
or the need for change will depend on how one defines the doctrine
under the old law. If, as the comments assume, the doctrine means
that one who conducts a title search "is charged with the knowledge
that a reasonable person would acquire from the public records...
. [and that] the presumption of good faith may be rebutted," NA 3481
comment (e) (emphasis added), no change will be necessary. If, however,
the doctrine means that the person who undertakes a title search is
charged with knowledge of any defect in the seller's chain of title
which is contained in the records, regardless of whether such defect
would be discoverable by a reasonably thorough search, then changes
will be necessary in order for the doctrine to conform to the reasonable
person standard.
Finally, the related jurisprudential rule which imputes to the buyer
the constructive knowledge received by the title examiner or the at-
torney through the operation of the public records doctrine may also
have to be reconsidered. See Martin v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle
Co., 228 La. 175, 81 So. 2d 852 (1955). The authority behind the rule
is not as solid as is commonly assumed, and the law of agency may
aid in preventing the operation of the rule in all those cases where
it can be shown that the title examiner is not a true agent of the
buyer, but is instead either an independent contractor or the agent
of the finance company.
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law defeats this presumption." sumed in matters of prescription;
This presumption is rebutted on and he who alleges bad faith in
proof that the possessor knows, or the possessor, must prove it.
should know, that he is not owner
of the thing he possesses. Art. 1846 IS 31. Invalidity of con-
tract for errors of law,
exceptions
Error in law, as well as error
in fact, invalidates a contract,
where such error is its only or
75. The second sentence of NA 3481 abrogates OA 1846(3), and
thus eliminates the foundation of the jurisprudential rule that one who
buys under error of law cannot be in good faith. See Dinwiddie v.
Cox, 9 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942). Although the change is com-
mendable, its impact cannot be easily determined. What NA 3481
means in the abstract is that error of law does not necessarily defeat
the presumption of good faith. The presumption is rebutted only if-
regardless of or despite an error of law-the possessor knew or should
have known that he was buying from a nonowner. How this article
will work in practice may well be a matter of speculation. One could
predict that the jurisprudence will eventually differentiate between
errors of law which are excusable and which do not destroy the
presumption of good faith and errors of law which are inexcusable
and which do destroy the presumption of good faith (one is not blind
who does not want to see). The determination of whether a particular
error of law falls within one or the other category will have to be
made "in light of objective considerations." Under this scheme the
old terms "moral good faith" and "legal bad faith" are entirely dispen-
sable. One is either in good faith or in bad faith. This is apparently
the meaning of comment (c) to NA 3481, which provides that the arti-
cle "overrules legislatively the doctrine of legal bad faith." What may
create some confusion is the erroneous citation in the same comment
of Martin v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co., 228 La. 175, 81 So. 2d
852 (1955), as an error-of-law case which is intended to be overruled.
Martin is instead a case of bad faith imputed to the possessor through
the operation of the public records doctrine and, as such, is an exam-
ple of the kind of bad faith that was sometimes also referred to as
"legal" bad faith. This kind of "legal" bad faith, in the sense of bad
faith imputed by law to a person despite his subjective good faith,
is not overruled but is rather enhanced by the new law's emphasis
on objective considerations.
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principal cause, subject to the
following modifications and
restrictions:
3. Error of law can never be
alleged as the means of acquiring,
though it may be invoked as the
means of preventing loss or of
recovering what has been given or
paid under such error. The error,
under which a possessor may be
as to the legality [illegality] of his
title, shall not give him a right to
prescribe under it.
Art. 3482. Good faith at Art. 3482. Good faith at
commencement of commencent of possession
prescription sufficient
It is sufficient that possession It is sufficient if the possession
has commenced in good faith; has commenced in good faith; and
subsequent bad faith does not pre- if the possession should after-
vent the accrual of prescription of wards be held in bad faith, that
ten years."6  shall not prevent the prescription.
76. For purposes of prescription, good faith and just title are
analytically distinct requirements, though both must be met in order
to enable the possessor to prescribe in ten years. Thus a possessor
may be technically in good faith even though he possesses under a
putative title, i.e., no title at all, the defects of which he is not aware
of. Such a possessor will, of course, not be able to prescribe by the
ten-year prescription. On the other hand, this same possessor cannot
be in good faith for purposes of accession, since under the law of ac-
cession good faith depends on the existence of a just title. See UA
487. Thus, through the two different definitions of good faith in UA
487 and NA 3480, the law ensures that a person who under UA 487
qualifies as a good faith possessor for accession purposes will also
be able eventually to prescribe by the ten-year prescription. This sym-
metry of treatment seems to be the only reason for the two different
definitions of good faith. "If it were otherwise, one would be allowed
to retain fruits but he could not acquire the ownership of the thing
in . . . ten years." UA 487, comment (c). This author does not find
the reasoning behind this scheme to be very compelling. It is not clear,
for instance, why a person who, as a result of an honest mistake, builds
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on the land of his neighbor and who cannot prescribe because he lacks
title should also be treated as a bad faith possessor for purposes of
accession, with all the harsh consequences imposed on him by UA
497. (UA 670 corrects this inequity only in part). Yet, individual
preferences aside, it must be recognized that this has always been
the scheme of the Civil Code.
The amendment of OA 3483-3486 by NA 3483, which now requires
that in order to qualify as a just title for purposes of prescription
the juridical act must be in writing and recorded, raises a new ques-
tion: Do these new requirements (writing and recordation) apply to
the just title referred to in UA 487? The principles of intertemporal
law suggest a negative answer on the ground that a given legal rule
must be interpreted against the background of the law existing at
the time of the rule's enactment and not later. Since, at the time of
the enactment of UA 487 in 1979 (or of the former article 503 of the
Civil Code of 1870 and its predecessor of the Civil Code of 1825), OA
3483-3486 did not require recordation, such requirement ought not to
be imposed unless it is established that the legislative intent behind
NA 3483 is to define just title for all purposes, including accession.
Although no such intent can be gathered from the comments to NA
3483, the comments under UA 487 seem to supply that intent by seek-
ing to ensure unity of treatment of possessors by the law of acces-
sion and prescription. The symmetry of the system will be disturbed
unless UA 487 is interpreted in light of NA 3483. In practice this
means that in order for someone to qualify as a good faith possessor
of an immovable, one has to have a recorded act translative of owner-
ship. This result is required by the established scheme of the Civil
Code. Whether the result is sound functionally depends on the sound-
ness of the scheme itself, and this author for one is not prepared to
defend it. If one accepts the view that the underlying basis of UA
486-489, 496-497, and 527-528 is the general principle of unjust enrich-
ment, that ought to be a sufficient reason to differentiate accession
from prescription.
Finally, another basic difference between good faith for purposes
of prescription and for purposes of accession is that while subsequent
bad faith does not prevent the accrual of prescription, see NA 3482,
OA 3482, subsequent bad faith affects the possessor's rights to the
fruits and other improvements he may be entitled to claim under the
law of accession. Thus, a possessor accounts to the owner differently
during the period of his good faith possession than during the period
of his subsequent bad faith possession. See UA 486, 496-497, 527-528.
Of course, this makes a difference only when the possessor is unable
for some reason to complete his prescription, because if he does so,
he acquires ownership of the thing retroactively to the beginning of
his possession.
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Art. 487.
For purposes of accession, a
possessor is in good faith when he
possesses by virtue of an act
translative of ownership and does
not know of any defects in his
ownership. He ceases to be in good
faith when these defects are made
known to him or an action is in-
stituted against him by the owner
for the recovery of the thing.7
OLD LAW
Art. 503.
He is bonafide possessor who
possesses as owner by virtue of
an act sufficient in terms to
transfer property, the defects of
which he was ignorant of. He
ceases to be a bonafide possessor
from the moment these defects are
made known to him, or are
declared to him by a suit instituted
for the recovery of the thing by
the owner.
TEN-YEAR PRESCRIPTION: THE REQUIREMENT OF JUST TITLE
Art. 3483. Just title
A just title is a juridical act,
such as a sale, exchange, or dona-
tion, sufficient to transfer owner-
ship or another real right. The act
must be written, valid in form, and
filed for registry in the con-
veyance records of the parish in
which the immovable is situated. 8
Art. 3483. Just title, definition
To be able to acquire by the
species of prescription mentioned
in this paragraph, a legal and
transferable title of ownership in
the possessor is necessary; this is
what is called in law a just title.
77. Revised by 1979 La. Acts, No. 180, §1.
78. New article 3483 reproduces in condensed form most of the
substance of OA 3483-3486 with two substantive changes, i.e., the title
must be in writing and must be recorded. The old law required that
in order to serve as just title the juridical act had to be "valid in
point of form," OA 3486(1), which for immovables meant that, at the
least, the act had to be in writing. However, under UA 2275 and
2440-2441 a "verbal sale . . . shall be valid against the vendor . ..
who confesses it when interrogated under oath." UA 2275. It was not
clear whether such a sale could qualify as just title. New article 3483
clarifies the question (or changes the law) by requiring the sale to
be in writing. The old law also did not require recordation on the
theory that the owner is put on notice by something much more
notorious than recordation, i.e., the possessor's adverse and open
possession. New article 3483 changes the law by requiring recorda-
tion. The change is made "in the interest of certainty of ownership,"
NA 3483, comment (d), which probably should be understood as "the
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certainty of the title examiner." It does not seem likely that the pur-
pose of the new requirement is to'put the record owner on notice
about adverse claims to his land, because an owner is not required
to check the public records at regular intervals, and when he does
so he is not likely to discover the adverse recordation unless he has
information leading to the adverse possessor. But see supra note 38.
Be that as it may, by making the ten-year prescription unavailable
to possessors with unrecorded title, record owners are protected in-
directly, and perhaps this is what the new law intends to accomplish.
In any event, since statistically the vast majority of titles are both
written and recorded, the new law is not likely to cause a major
upheaval in that respect. What may cause problems is a statement
in comment (d) to NA 3483 which provides that "prescription com-
mences to run from the date of filing for registry rather than from
the date of entry into possession." This statement entails a change
in the law going beyond the letter and perhaps the spirit of NA 3483.
See generally Note, supra note 4, at 1082. The ramifications of this
change are shown in the following illustrations.
(1) On January 1, 1984, B in good faith acquires a just title from
A (also a good faith possessor) and enters into corporeal possession
on the same date. Unless he records his title, B will never be able
to prescribe by the ten-year prescription, but only by the thirty-year
prescription. Until the thirty-year prescription accrues, B will be
vulnerable to a petitory action by the true owner. Since B will be
lacking one of the "new" elements of the ten-year prescription, he
will presumably not be able to tack A's possession for the purpose
of the ten-year prescription. See discussion of Bartlett, 412 So. 2d 597,
supra notes 65, 70.
(2) Same facts as above, except that B records his title on January
3, 1985. According to comment (d) of NA 3483, B will begin prescrib-
ing on that date rather than on the date he entered into possession,
January 1, 1984. Again, since the one year of possession without record-
ation (here the year 1984) does not count for purposes of the ten-
year prescription, B will presumably not be able to tack A's posses-
sion, and thus B will not prescribe until January 3, 1995. (In a strange
way the year 1984 represents an interruption of prescription even
though there is no interruption of possession, a seemingly anomalous
phenomenon). A better solution might be to state that prescription
does not commence running until B records his title, but that when
he does, prescription includes retroactively the time B possessed
without recordation.
(3) Same dates as above, but the facts are reversed. B records
his title on January 1, 1984, but does not enter into corporeal posses-
sion until January 3, 1985. Provided that nobody possessed adversely
to B during the entire period of January 1, 1984 to January 3, 1985,
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Art. 3484. Title from person
believed to be owner
By the term just title in cases
of prescription, we do not under-
stand that which the possessor
may have derived from the true
owner, for then no true prescrip-
tion would be necessary, but a title
which the possessor may have
received from any person whom he
honestly believed"9 to be the real
owner, provided the title were
such as to transfer the ownership
of the property.
Art. 3485. Title of nature to
transfer ownership
And in this case, by the phrase
transfer the ownership of the pro-
perty, we understand not such a
title, as shall have really transfer-
B will begin prescribing on January 1, 1984 and will also be able to
tack A's possession. However, if B was dispossessed during the en-
tire period of January 1, 1984 to January 3, 1985, his prior recorda-
tion will not help, since recordation without possession does not count
towards prescription. In such event, B will start prescribing on the
date he enters into possession, January 3, 1985. Tacking will again
be precluded.
To be sure, neither the rule requiring recordation of the just title
nor the "rule" that prescription does not commence until recordation
should be applied retroactively to persons who completed the ten-year
prescription before the effective date of Act 187, January 1, 1983.
On the other hand, the new rules could presumably be applied (retroac-
tively?) to persons who began but did not complete their prescription
before January 1, 1983, on the theory that, until prescription accrues,
the possessor does not have a vested property right but only expec-
tations or inchoate rights which can be curtailed by new legislation
without any constitutional problems.
79. (Emphasis added). The italicized language pertains to the good
faith requirement rather than to just title. For the reasons this
language is not included in the new law, see supra note 74.
[Vol. 44
POSSESSION AND PRESCRIPTION
NEW LAW OLD LAW
red the ownerhip of the property,
but a title which by its nature,
would have been sufficient to
transfer the ownership of the pro-
perty, provided it had been
derived from the real owners, such
as a sale, exchange, legacy or
donation.
Thus, prescription could not
be acquired under a title resulting
from a lease or loan, because these
contracts do not transfer the
ownership of the property.
Art. 3486. Additional requisites of
title
It is necessary besides:
1. That the title be valid in
point of form; for if the possession
commenced by a title void in that
respect, it can not serve as a foun-
dation for prescription.
2. That the title be certain;
thus, every possessor, who can not
fix exactly the origin of his posses-
sion, can not prescribe.
3. That the title be proved;
for as it consists in a fact, it is not
presumed, and every man who
founds his title on a written instru-
ment must produce it, or prove the
contents, if it be lost.'
Art. 3484. Transfer of undivided
part of an immovable
A just title to an undivided in-
terest in an immovable is such on-
ly as to the interest transferred."
80. Sections (2) and (3) of OA 3486 are not reproduced in the new
law as self-evident. NA 3483, comment (e).




Art. 3485. Things susceptible of
prescription
All private things are suscep-
tible of prescription unless pre-
scription is excluded by legisla-
tion.
OLD LAW
Art. 3497. Things susceptible of
alienation
The last condition required for
prescription is, that the thing,
which is the object of it, be suscep-
tible by its nature of alienation,
and the alienation of which is not
prohibited by law.
LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES 9:5630:
ACTIONS BY UNRECOGNIZED HEIRS 2
LA. R.S. 9:5630. Actions by
unrecognized successor
against third persons
A. An action by a person
who is a successor of a deceased
person, and who has not been
recognized as such in the judg-
ment of possession rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction, to
assert an interest in an immovable
formerly owned by the deceased,




A. An action by a person
who is an heir or legatee of a
deceased person, and who has not
been recognized as such in the
judgment of possession rendered
in the succession of the deceased
by a court of competent jurisdic-
comments to NA 3484 contain useful illustrations of the operation of
the article. They can be summarized as follows.
(1) A, the owner of a 1/3 undivided share in Blackacre, transfers
his 1/3 share to B. B becomes owner of the 1/3, but does not have
a just title to the other 2/3.
(2) Same facts, except that A sells the whole of Blackacre to B.
Now B is owner of the 1/3 and has just title to the other 2/3.
(3) X, who does not have any rights to Blackacre, transfers an
undivided 1/4 of Blackacre to Z. Z has a just title to the 1/4 but no
just title to the other 3/4.
82. Although the new Act does not address this subject, it is dealt
with here because of its obvious relevance to acquisitive prescription.
LA. R.S. 9:5682 was first enacted in 1960 and was amended for the first
time in 1975. See under OLD LAW in text. In 1981, it was drastically
revised and renumbered by Act 721. See under NEW LAW in text.
The only amendment made by Act 37 of 1982, was the substitution
of "acquisitive" for "liberative" in subsection (B) of LA. R.S. 9:5630.




against a third person who has ac-
quired an interest in the im-
movable by onerous title from a
person recognized as an heir or
legatee of the deceased in the
judgment of possession, or his suc-
cessors, is prescribed in two years
from the date of the finality of the
judgment of possession.
B. This section establishes an
acquisitive prescription, and shall
be applied both retrospectively
No. 721, S 1; 1982 La. Acts, No. 37
tive changes:
OLD LAW
tion, to assert any right, title, or
interest in any of the property
formerly owned by the deceased
against a third person who has ac-
quired this property from or
through a person recognized as an
heir or legatee of the deceased in
this judgment of possession, is
prescribed in ten years if the third
person, or his ancestors in title,
singly or collectively, have been
in continuous, uninterrupted,
§ 1, made the following substan-
(1) It reduced prescription from ten to two years;
(2) It limited the scope of the prescription from "any property"
to immovables only-this limitation became necessary because of the
reduction of prescription from ten to two years;
(3) it made prescription unavailable to those defendants who
acquired from the heirs by a gratuitous rather than an onerous title;
(4) it eliminated the requirement that the defendant be in "con-
tinuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public possession of the property";
and
(5) it changed the characterization of the prescription from
liberative to acquisitive. Until 1981, the prescription of LA. R.S. 9:5630
was expressly declared to be liberative, which was a conceptual
anomaly, since this was the only liberative prescription which required
some activity (possession) by the debtor (the "third person" who
acquired from the recognized heirs). The 1981 elimination of the re-
quirement of possession resolved the conceptual problem, but not a
more serious practical one: If the "third person" who bought from
the recognized heirs was dispossessed by a squatter (unrelated to the
recognized or the unrecognized heirs) for more than a year, the "third
person" could not bring the petitory action against the squatter. The
liberative prescription of LA. R.S. 9:5630 protected the plaintiff against
the unrecognized heirs and those in privity with them but did not
vest in him ownership good against the world. In order to resolve
the impasse, Act 37 of 1982 amended LA. R.S. 9:5630, so that the
prescription is now acquisitive. The old conceptual anomaly is now
revived in a different form: This is the only acquisitive prescription
which (in addition to being painfully short) does not require possession.
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and prospectively; however, any
person whose rights would be
adversely affected by this Section
shall have one year from
September 11, 1981 within which
to assert the action described in
Subsection A of this Section and
if no such action is instituted
within that time, such claim shall
be forever barred.
C. "Third person" means a
person other than one recognized
as an heir or legatee of the
deceased in the judgment of
possession.
LA. R.S. 9:5631. Minors, inter-
dicts and posthumous
children
The prescription herein pro-
vided shall accrue against all per-
sons including minors, interdicts,
and posthumous children.
peaceable, public, and unequivocal
possession of the property for such
period after the registry of the
judgment of possession in the con-
veyance records of the parish
where the property is situated, ir-
respective of the good faith or bad
faith of the third person's
ancestors in title, including the
heir or legatee of the deceased
recognized as such in the judg-
ment of possession.
B. This Section establishes a
liberative prescription, and shall
be applied both retrospectively
and prospectively; provided,
however, that an action by any
person against whom the period
of liberative prescription herein
provided would otherwise already
have accrued except for the pro-
visions of this Section, must be
brought within one year from and
after August 1, 1975.
C. As used herein, "third
person" means a person other than
one recognized as an heir or
legatee of the deceased in the
judgment of possession.
LA. R.S. 9:5683. Minors
The prescription provided
herein shall accrue against a minor
either as provided in R.S. 9:5682,
or in nineteen years from the date
of his birth, whichever is longer
and shall accrue against an inter-
dict as provided in R.S. 9:5682; but
once the prescription provided in
R.S. 9:5682 has commenced to run
against an adult, it is not inter-
rupted by the minority of any of
his heirs on his death.
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LA. R.S. 9:5684. Retroactive
application
This act shall apply retroac-
tively, but any person whose
rights would otherwise be
prescribed hereunder has a period
of six months from the effective
date hereof to assert such rights
judicially.
THIRTY-YEAR PRESCRIPTION OF IMMOVABLES
Art. 3486. Immovables; prescrip-
tion of thirty years
Ownership and other real
rights in immovables may be ac-
quired by the prescription of thir-
ty years without the need of just
title or possession in good faith.
Art. 3475. Immovables, possessor
without title or good faith
Immovables are prescribed
for by thirty years without any ti-
tle on the part of the possessor,
or whether he be in good faith or
not.
Art. 3499. Immovables,
possession without title or
good faith
The ownership of immovables
is prescribed for by thirty years
without any need of title or posses-
sion in good faith.
Art. 3500. Attributes of
possession for thirty-year
prescription
The possession on which this
prescription is founded must be
continuous and uninterrupted dur-
ing all the time; it must be public
and unequivocal, and under the ti-
tle of owner.83
83. The substance of OA 3500 is reproduced in NA 3435, 3476.
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Art. 3487. Restriction as to
extent of possession
For purposes of acquisitive
prescription without title, posses-
sion extends only to that which
has been actually possessed.
Art. 3501. Preservation of
possession once acquired
The possession necessary for
this species of prescription, when
it has commenced by the corporal
possession of the thing, may, if it
has not been interrupted, be
preserved by external and public
signs, announcing the possessor's
intention to preserve the posses-
sion of the thing, as the keeping
up of roads and levees, the pay-
ment of taxes, and other similar
acts. 4
Art. 3502. Vestiges of works or
house as preserving
possession
A man may even retain the
civil possession of an estate, suffi-
cient to prescribe, so long as there
remain on it any vestiges of works
erected by him, as, for example,
the ruins of a house.
Art. 3503. Restriction as to
extent of possession
How favorable soever
prescription may be, it shall be
restricted within just limits. Thus,
in the prescription of thirty years,
which is acquired without title, it
extends only to that which has
been actually possessed by the
person pleading it.
84. Old articles 3501-3502 reappear partially in NA 3431-3432.




Art. 3488. Applicability of rules
governing prescription of ten
years
The rules governing acquisi-
tive prescription of ten years
apply to the prescription of thirty
years to the extent that their
application is compatible with the
prescription of thirty years.
OLD LAW
Art. 3505. Applicability of rules
governing ten-year
prescription
All the rules established in the
preceding paragraph with regard
to the prescription of ten years,
are applicable to the prescription
of thirty years, except in the pro-
visions contained in the present
paragraph, which are contrary to
or incompatible with them.
MOVABLES: ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION; REVENDICATION OF LOST OR
STOLEN THINGS
Art. 3489. Movables; acquisitive
prescription
Ownership and other real
rights in movables may be
acquired either by the prescrip-
tion of three years or by the
prescription of ten years.
Art. 3490. Prescription of three
years
One who has possessed a
movable as owner, in good faith,
under an act sufficient to transfer
ownership, and without interrup-
tion for three years, acquired
ownership by prescription.
Art. 3476. Movables
The ownership of movables is
prescribed for after the lapse of
three years.85
Art. 3506. Movables, possession
in good faith with just title;
stolen or lost things excepted
If a person has possessed in
good faith and by a just title, as
owner, a movable thing, during
three successive years without in-
terruption, he shall acquire the
ownership of it by prescription
unless the thing was stolen or lost.w
85. The article was obviously incomplete. It was supplemented
by OA 3509 providing for ten-year prescription.
86. (Emphasis added). Lost or stolen things may now be acquired
by the three-year prescription since the italicized language in OA 3506
is missing from NA 3490. To be sure, the thief himself may not
prescribe by the shorter prescription since he is in bad faith, but his
transferee may prescribe by the shorter prescription if in good faith.
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Art. 3491. Prescription of ten
years
One who has possessed a
movable as owner for ten years ac-
quires ownership by prescription.
Neither title nor good faith is re-
quired for this prescription.
Art. 521. Lost or stolen thing
One who has possession of a
lost or stolen thing may not
transfer its ownership to another.
For purposes of this Chapter, a
thing is stolen when one has taken
possession of it without the con-
sent of its owner. A thing is not
stolen when the owner delivers it
or transfers its ownership to
another as a result of fraud. 7
Art. 524. Recovery of lost or
stolen things
The owner of a lost or stolen
movable may recover it from a
possessor who bought it in good
OLD LAW
Art. 3509. Movables, possession
without title or good faith
When the possessor of any
movable whatever has possessed
it for ten years without interrup-
tion, he shall acquire the owner-
ship of it without being obliged to
produce title or to prove that he
did not act in bad faith.
Similarly, the finder of a lost movable acquires its ownership by
occupancy in three years upon compliance with the requirements of
NA 3419 ("diligent effort," etc.), but his good faith transferee may
acquire by the three-year prescription without having to comply with
NA 3419.
The change comes as a surprise, especially since only a year earlier
the legislature had repealed the short-lived but milder and much sounder
Civil Code article 520. Article 520 allowed a nonowner entrusted with
possession of a movable by the owner to convey ownership of the thing
to a transferee in good faith and for fair value. Article 520 was milder
than NA 3490 in the sense that it excluded lost or stolen things, see UA
521, but was harsher on the owner in the sense that it vested immediate
ownership in the transferee. See Note, supra note 4, at 1084.
87. Added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 180, § 1.
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faith at a public auction or from
a merchant customarily selling
similar things on reimbursing the
purchase price."
The former owner of a lost,
stolen, or abandoned movable that
has been sold by authority of law
may not recover it from the
purchaser.
88. Added by 1979 La. Acts, No. 180, 1. The combined reading
of NA 3490-3491 and UA 524 and 526 produces the following results:
As a general rule, the true owner may revendicate the thing in the
hands of any possessor, see UA 526, who has not yet acquired owner-
ship by prescription, NA 3490-3491, or occupancy, NA 3419, without
reimbursing the purchase price. However, in one situation the owner's
right to recover the thing is conditioned on his ability and willingness
to reimburse to the defendant the purchase price. UA 524, 529. This
happens when all the following requirements are met: (1) the thing
was stolen (theft is defined by UA 521 in more narrow terms than
in criminal law) and (2) the thing was subsequently bought by the
defendant: (a) in good faith and (b) "at a public auction or from a mer-
chant customarily selling similar things." UA 524. If one of the above
requirements is missing, the owner may recover the thing without
reimbursing the purchase price at any time before the accrual of the
three-year or ten-year prescription, as the case may be. Revendica-
tion is altogether excluded when the thing is "sold by authority of
law." UA 524 para. 2; see Note, supra note 4, at 1084.
The Blackwell rule, see Securities Sales Co. v. Blackwell, 167 La.
667, 120 So. 45 (1929), which provided that reimbursement of the pur-
chase price was required only if the thing was recovered after three
years from the purchase but not before, was legislatively overruled
in 1979 by UA 524. The repeal of article 520 by Act 125 of 1981 raised
a viable argument that Blackwell was or should be resurrected. The
new Act decreases the need for a Blackwell-type rule since lost or
stolen things may now be acquired by the three-year prescription and
thus cannot be recovered after the lapse of three years. This approach,
however, does not cover cases where, because of some reason such
as an inability to tack, the prescription accrues more than three years
from the loss by or theft from the owner.
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Art. 3419. Lost things
One who finds a corporeal
movable that has been lost is
bound to make a diligent effort to
locate its owner or possessor and
to return the thing to him.
If a diligent effort is made and
the owner is not found within
three years, the finder acquires
ownership.
OLD LAW
Art. 3422. Finding lost things
If he, who has found a movable
thing that was lost, having caused
it to be published in newspapers,
and having done all that was possi-
ble to find out the true owner, can
not learn who he is, he remains
master of it till he, who was the
proper owner, appears and proves
his right; but if it be not claimed
within ten years, the thing be-
comes his property, and he may
dispose of it at his will.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PRESCRIPTION8 9
Art. 3445. Kinds of prescription
There are three kinds of
prescription: acquisitive prescrip-
tion, liberative prescription, and
prescription of nonuse."
Art. 3457. Prescription; general
definition
Prescription is a manner of ac-
quiring the ownership of proper-
ty, or discharging debts, by the ef-
fect of time, and under the condi-
tions regulated by law.
Each of these prescriptions
has its special and particular
definition.
89. New. articles 3445-3472 dealing with the general principles of
prescription precede logically and actually the articles on acquisitive
prescription. Nevertheless, the order of presentation was reversed in
this paper in order to demonstrate more clearly the interdependence
between the articles on possession and those on acquisitive
prescription.
90. For the prescription of nonuse, which is now set out as a third







Acquisitive prescription is a
mode of acquiring ownership or
other real rights by possession for
a period of time.
Art. 3447. Liberative prescription
Liberative prescription is a
mode of barring of actions92 as a





The prescription by which the
ownership9 of property is ac-
quired, is a right by which a mere
possessor acquires the ownership
of a thing which he possesses by
the continuance of his possession
during the time fixed by law.
Art. 3459. Liberative
prescription, definition
The prescription by which
debts are released, is a peremp-
tory and perpetual bar to every9
species of action, real or personal,
when the creditor has been silent
for a certain time without urging
his claim.
91. The use of the word "ownership" by OA 3457-3458 might
create the impression that real rights other than ownership could not
be acquired by prescription. This was, of course, not true since
usufruct and apparent servitudes may be acquired by prescription.
See UA 544, 742; see also NA 3446, comment (b). New article 3446
is more accurate in using the words "ownership or other real rights."
92. According to LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 421 an action is "a demand
for enforcement of a legal right," and according to comment (c) to NA
3447 "[i]t is the equivalent of the Roman actio expressed in terms of
substantive law." Upon accrual of prescription, the action is extinguish-
ed but there subsists a natural obligation. See UA 1758(3). Compare NA
3448 (prescription of nonuse) with NA 3458 (peremption).
93. It was not true that "every species of action" was barred by
liberative prescription. Petitory actions and boundary actions were im-
prescriptible despite the language of OA 3459 and UA 3548 (in force un-
til January 1, 1984). See UA 481 para. 2; Buckley v. Catlett, 203 La. 54,
13 So. 2d 384 (1943) (petitory action); UA 788 (boundary action). Thus
NA 3447 is more accurate in speaking of "actions" rather than "every
species of action." See NA 3447, comment (b), which also explains all the
other phraseological differences between that article and OA 3457 and
3459.
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operates a release from debts,
discharges the debtor by the mere
silence of the creditor during the
time fixed by law, from all actions,
real or personal, which might be
brought against him.'
Art. 3448. Prescription of nonuse Art. 3529. Liberative prescription
Prescription of nonuse is a of real rights
mode of extinction of a real right This prescription has also the
other than ownership as a result effect of releasing the owner of an
of failure to exercise the right for estate from every species of real
a period of time.95  rights, to which the property may
have been subject, if the person
in possession of the right has not
exercised it during the time re-
quired by law.
94. Civil Code arts. 3528-3529 were not affected by Act 187 of 1982,
but have in the meantime been eliminated by Act 173 of 1983, effective
January 1, 1984.
95. The prescription of nonuse is now set out as a third kind of
prescription rather than as a species of liberative prescription, as it was
under the old law. See UA 3529. This approach does not entail a substan-
tive change in the law. Although the prescription of nonuse partakes
of the nature of both the liberative and the acquisitive prescriptions,
it is different from both. It is similar to the liberative prescription in
the sense that the mere inaction of the holder of the real right (who is
analogous to the creditor), without any adverse activity by the person
whose thing is burdened with the real right (who is analogous to the deb-
tor), liberates the latter. Yet, it is different from liberative prescription
in that the accrual of the prescription of nonuse extinguishes the real
right itself, whereas accrual of liberative prescription bars only the
remedy. See supra note 92. The prescription of nonuse is also similar
to acquisitive prescription in the sense that upon accrual, a real right
is lost by one person and acquired by another. Yet, in the prescription
of nonuse the right is lost because of the holder's inaction alone, whereas







There is no prescription other
than that established by legisla-
tion.
Art. 3452. Necessity for pleading
prescription
Prescription must be pleaded.
Courts may not supply a plea of
prescription."
Art. 3453. Rights of creditors and
other interested parties
Creditors and other persons
having an interest in the acquisi-
tion of a thing or in the extinction
of a claim or of a real right by
prescription may plead prescrip-
tion, even if the person in whose
favor prescription has accrued re-




established only by Code or
statute
There are no other prescrip-
tions than those established by
this Code and the statutes of this
State now in force.
Art. 3463. Necessity for pleading
prescription
Courts can not supply the plea
of prescription.
Art. 3464. When prescription
may be pleaded
Prescription may be pleaded
in every stage of a cause, even on
the appeal, but it ought to be
pleaded expressly and specially
before the final judgment.97
Art. 3466. Right of creditors and
other interested parties to
plead prescription
Creditors and all other per-
sons, who may have an interest in
the acquiring of an estate, or the
extinguishment of an obligation by
prescription, shall have a right to
plead it, even in case the person
claiming such estate, or bound by
such obligation, should renounce
such right of prescription.
owner's inaction but also the possessor's adverse activity. By setting
prescription of nonuse aside as a separate kind of prescription, the new
law facilitates a better understanding of the function of the prescrip-
tion of nonuse.
96. Compare NA 3452 with NA 3460 (peremption).
97. The deletion of OA 3464-3465 does not entail any substantive
change. The matter is now governed by LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 928 (para.
2), 929, 931, 2163.
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RENUNCIATION; EXTENSION; ACKNOWLEDGMENT"
Art. 3449. Renunciation of Art. 3460. Renunciation of
prescription prescription
Prescription may be re- One can not renounce a pre-
nounced only after it has accrued. scription not yet acquired, but it
is lawful to renounce prescription
when once acquired.
98. Because NA 3449-3451, 3464 and 3471 are closely interrelated,
they are treated together here, although they are located in different
sections of the Code.
(1) Renunciation is the abandonment of the debtor's right to avail
himself of the protection of prescription when prescription accrues.
At the time the obligation is contracted and until prescription accrues,
the debtor is peculiarly vulnerable to the pressure of the creditor.
In order to protect debtors and to discourage coercive practices by
creditors, the law prohibits renunciation before accrual of prescrip-
tion. When prescription accrues, however, the debtor is no longer
vulnerable to the creditor. This is why the law allows the debtor at
this point, but not before, to voluntarily renounce prescription and
to perform his natural obligation. See NA 3449; OA 3460.
(2) An agreement purporting to lengthen prescription is tanta-
mount to renunciation, the only difference being one of degree. Instead
of renouncing prescription altogether, the debtor simply agrees to
plead prescription at a later time than he would be allowed to by
law. The jurisprudence has recognized the similarity and has declared
such agreements invalid. See E.L. Burns Co. v. Cashio, 302 So. 2d 297
(La. 1974). New article 3471 confirms that jurisprudence. For
agreements purporting to shorten prescription, see infra note 100.
(3) Acknowledgment is the recognition by the debtor of his obliga-
tion to perform. When it takes place before accrual, acknowledgment
interrupts prescription, even if not accompanied by a promise to per-
form. Such a promise is unnecessary since, until prescription accrues,
there exists a binding, legal obligation. Acknowledgment prolongs the
life of the obligation by the amount of time that has run before the
moment acknowledgment takes place. In this sense, it is similar to
agreements lengthening prescription (which are prohibited by NA
3471), except that in the latter the extent by which prescription is
prolonged is fixed by the agreement itself and may purport to be
longer than would be possible with an acknowledgment. The difference
may be illustrated by the following two hypotheticals. (a) In a five-
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Art. 3450. Express or tacit Art. 3461. Express or tacit
renunciation renunciation
Renunciation may be express Such renunciation of prescrip-
or tacit. Tacit renunciation results tion is either express or tacit.
from circumstances that give rise A tacit renunciation results
to a presumption that the advan- from a fact which gives a presump-
year prescription that commenced in 1980, the debtor acknowledges
his debt in 1983. Since acknowledgment interrupts prescription, a new
five-year prescription will commence in 1983 and will accrue in 1988.
The extent by which prescription will be prolonged in this case is
three years (1985-88), corresponding to the time that had run before
interruption (1980-83). (b) Same facts as above, except that in 1983
the debtor executes a juridical act purporting to prolong prescription
so as to make it accrue in 1990. Such a juridical act is invalid under
NA 3471, but insofar as it contains an implicit recognition of the debt,
it will serve as an acknowledgment which interrupts prescription. The
new prescription will again accrue in 1988. The conclusion then is that
agreements to lengthen prescription are invalid only insofar as they
purport to extend prescription beyond the point to which acknowledg-
ment could extend it. Agreements lengthening prescription short of
that point are permitted because, after all, they do not really lengthen
prescription. See infra note 100 for agreements shortening
prescription.
(4) An acknowledgment that takes place after accrual is of no
benefit to the creditor unless accompanied by a new promise to per-
form. The new promise is necessary in order to revive the legal obliga-
tion which was converted into a natural obligation the moment
prescription accrued. When accompanied by a promise to perform, the
acknowledgment that takes place after accrual is tantamount to a
renunciation, which always presupposes such a promise. See Harmon
v. Harmon, 308 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); cf. McPherson v.
Roy, 390 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
(5) As used in this note, the word "debtor" signifies anyone who
benefits from the accrual of prescription. In liberative prescription,
this person is the debtor; in acquisitive prescription, he is the
possessor; and in the prescription of nonuse, he is the person who
has a real right in the thing of another. Similarly, the word "creditor"
signifies the person who stands to lose from the accrual of prescrip-
tion, i.e., respectively the creditor, the owner, and the person whose
thing is burdened with the real right of another.
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tages of prescription have been tion of the relinquishment of the
abandoned. right acquired by prescription.
Nevertheless, with respect to
immovables, renunciation of
acquisitive prescription must be
express and in writing.9
Art. 3451. Capacity to renounce Art. 3462. Capacity to renounce
To renounce prescription, one To be capable of renouncing
must have capacity to alienate, the right of prescription, one must
be capable of alienating his prop-
erty.
Art. 3471. Limits of contractual
freedom
A juridical act purporting to
exclude prescription, to specify a
99. New article 3450 para. 2 changes the law by requiring that,
with respect to immovables, renunciation "must be express and in
writing." The change is "in the interest of security of titles," NA 3450,
comment, but probably not in the best interest of the record owner,
since it makes renunciation more cumbersome. But cf. UA 626, 772;
LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:54-:55.
In McPherson v. Roy, 390 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980), the
plaintiffs obtained a lease from the defendant's ancestor which,
unknown to plaintiffs, included in part land which they had possessed
adversely for more than thirty years. The trial court held that "upon
acceptance of the . . . lease .. . and operating thereunder ... [plain-
tiffs] effectively waived and abandoned all rights previously acquired
in such property." Id. at 550. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal
reversed, finding that, under the circumstances, there was neither
express nor tacit renunciation, and holding that "a renunciation of
accrued prescription to be effective must be unequivocal and takes
place only when the intent to renounce is clear, direct and absolute."
Id. at 551. By requiring renunciation to be "express and in writing,"
the new law confirms the McPherson holding, which under the old
law was a little overstated. It may be worth mentioning at this point
that a lease knowingly accepted by the possessor before the accrual
of prescription not only serves as an acknowledgment which inter-
rupts prescription, but also prevents prescription from ever running
again by giving the possession a precarious character.
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longer period.. than that esta-
blished by law, or to make the re-
quirements of prescription more
onerous,' °' is null.' 2
100. For agreements purporting to lengthen prescription, see
supra note 98. With regard to agreements purporting to shorten
prescription, the clear implication of NA 3471 is that they are in prin-
ciple valid. The argument inclusio unius est exclusio alterius is clearly
applicable here. The fact that Greek Civil Code article 275, which is
reproduced in the comments as the source provision of NA 3471, pro-
hibits such agreements simply reinforces the argument that had the
redactors wanted to prohibit such agreements they would have said
so expressly. From a policy standpoint, agreements shortening
prescription-unlike renunciations or agreements lengthening
prescription -not only reduce the court's workload by clearing many
claims from the docket at an earlier date, but work to the benefit
of the debtor who is usually the weak party. Such agreements,
therefore, ought to be in principle valid, unless the law expressly pro-
vides otherwise, or unless it turns out that the debtor is in fact the
economically strong party. In the latter situation, the agreement should
be invalidated if it bears adhesionary characteristics. For an example
in which the law expressly prohibits the shortening of prescription
to less than one year, see LA. R.S. 22:629(A)(3) (1978) (insurance con-
tracts). It is not a coincidence that in such contracts the creditor (in-
sured) is the economically weak party.
101. In keeping with the spirit of the article, the phrase "to make
the requirements of prescription more onerous" must be understood
as referring to requirements more onerous to the debtor, not to the
creditor. This conclusion is also-borne out by a comparison with the
source provision, Greek Civil Code article 275.
102. Earlier drafts contained the following sentence after what is
now NA 3471: "Nevertheless, a written juridical act expressly suspend-
ing the running of prescription for a period of up to six months is
valid." REVISION, BOOK III, TITLES XXIII AND XXIV, DOc. No. 3-10-2,
art. 3471 (Semantics Comm., Mar. 18, 1982) supra note 35; REVISION,
BOOK III, TITLE XXIV (NEW), DOc. No. 2-22-2, art. 3471 (Coordinating
Comm., Feb. 27, 1982) supra note 35; see also REVISION, BOOK III, TI-
TLE XXIV (NEW), DOC. No. 1-29, art. 3471 (Council Meeting, Feb. 19,
1982) supra note 35. The sentence was not included in the text
presented to the legislature.
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Art. 3464. Interruption by
acknowledgment
Prescription is interrupted
when one acknowledges the right
of the person against whom he had
commenced to prescribe.
Art. 3520. Interruption by
debtor's acknowledgment
Prescription ceases likewise
to run whenever the debtor, or
possessor, makes acknowledgment
of the right of the person whose
title they prescribed.
INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION
Art. 3466. Effect of interruption
If prescription is interrupted,
the time that has run is not
counted. Prescription commences
to run anew from the last day of
interruption.'
Art. 3462. Interruption by filing
suit or by service of process
Prescription is interrupted
when the owner commences action
against the possessor, or when the
obligee commences action against
the obligor, in a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction and venue. If ac-
tion is commenced in an incompe-
tent court, or in an improper
venue, prescription is interrupted
only as to a defendant served by
process within the prescriptive
period."'
103. New article 3466 is new
Art. 3615. Methods of
interrupting prescription
There are two modes of inter-
rupting prescription; that is, by a
natural interruption, or by a legal
interruption.
Art. 3518. Legal interruption by
filing of suit
A legal interruption takes
place, when the possessor has
been cited to appear before a court
of justice, on account either of the
ownership or of the possession;
and the prescription is interrupted
by such demand, whether the suit
has been brought before a court
of competent jurisdiction or not.
The provisions of this article
likewise apply to actions ex delic-
to, heretofore or hereafter filed,
but does not change the law. The
difference in effect between interruption and suspension is that in
the former, the time that has run before interruption is "wiped out,"
see NA 3466, comment (b), whereas in suspension the time that has
run before suspension is added to the time running after the end of
the suspension. Compare NA 3466 with NA 3472.
104. New article 3462 replaces both OA 3518 and LA. R.S. 9:5801
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Art. 3463. Duration of interrup-
tion; abandonment or discon-
tinuance of suit
An interruption of prescrip-
tion resulting from the filing of a
suit in a competent court and in
the proper venue or from service
of process within the prescriptive
period continues as long as the suit
is pending.105 Interruption is con-
sidered never to have occurred if
the plaintiff abandons, voluntarily
dismisses, or fails to prosecute the
suit at the trial.
in a United States District Court
of America, when and if said court
holds it is not a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.
La. R.S. 9:5801. Interruption of
prescription by filing of suit,
service of process
All prescriptions affecting the
cause of action therein sued upon
are interrupted as to all defen-
dants, including minors or inter-
dicts, by the commencement of a
civil action in a court of competent
jurisdiction and in the proper
venue. When the pleading present-
ing the judicial demand is filed
in an incompetent court, or in an
improper venue, prescription is in-
terrupted as to the defendant
served by the service of process.
105. The first sentence of NA 3463 clarifies the law by providing
that during the pendency of the suit, prescription is in a state of con-
tinuous interruption rather than suspension as held by some cases.
This makes a difference only when the action is dismissed without
prejudice. In such event, the period before the filing of the action,
as well as the period of the pendency of the action, does not count
towards prescription. A new prescription commences to run from the
day of dismissal without prejudice. See NA 3463, comment (b) and
authorities cited therein. For example, suppose that one month before
the accrual of a one-year prescriptive period, P files suit which is
dismissed without prejudice two years later. P has another year, not
one month, within which to file a new suit. Cf. Garrity v. Cazayoux,
430 So. 2d 1138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
For a recent discussion of "voluntary dismissal" under the last
sentence of NA 3463, see Hebert v. Cournoyer Oldsmobile-Cadillac
GMC, 419 So. 2d 878 (La. 1982).
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Art. 3464. Interruption by
acknowledgment
Prescription is interrupted
when one acknowledges the right
of the person against whom he had
commenced to prescribe."'6
Art. 3465. Interruption of
acquisitive prescription
Acquisitive prescription is in-
terrupted when possession is lost.
The interruption is considered
never to have occurred if the
possessor recovers possession
within one year or if he recovers
possession later by virtue of an ac-
tion brought within the year.0 7
Art. 3519. Abandonment or
discontinuance
If the plaintiff in this case,
after having made his demand,
abandons, voluntarily dismisses,
or fails to prosecute it at the trial,
the interruption is considered as
never having happened.
Art. 3520. Interruption by
debtor's acknowledgment
Prescription ceases likewise
to run whenever the debtor, or
possessor, makes acknowledgment
of the right of the person whose
title they prescribed.
Art. 3517. Natural interruption
by physical deprivation
A natural interruption is said
to take place when the possessor
is deprived of the possession of the
thing during more than a year,
either by the ancient proprietor
or even by a third person.
SUSPENSION OF PRESCRIPTION
Art. 3472. Effect of suspension
The period of suspension is
not counted toward accrual of
prescription. Prescription com-
mences to run again upon the ter-
mination of the period of
suspension.'8
106. The article is discussed supra note 98. The comments to NA
3464 contain a useful discussion of acknowledgment and its formalities.
107. The article is discussed supra note 62.
108. The article is new but does not change the law. Compare with




Art. 3467. Persons against whom
prescription runs
Prescription runs against all
persons unless exception is
established by legislation.1"9
Art. 3468. Minors and interdicts
Prescription is suspended
against minors and interdicts
unless exception is established by
legislation."'
OLD LAW
Art. 3521. Persons against whom
prescription suspended
Prescription runs against all
persons, unless they are included
in some exception established by
law.
Art. 3522. Minors and interdicts
Minors and persons under in-
terdiction can not be prescribed
against, except in the cases jro-
vided by law.
109. New article 3467 is identical in content to OA 3521 under
whose regime the jurisprudence had developed, in effect contra legem,
the doctrine of contra non valentem agere non currit prescriptio. See,
e.g., Corsey v. State Dept. of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1979).
Under the principles of intertemporal law, the reenactment of NA
3467, and especially the use of the word "legislation" as opposed to
the word "law" in OA 3521, should normally result in abolishing the
previous contra legem jurisprudence. To prevent that from happen-
ing, an earlier draft added a second paragraph to NA 3467 giving
express legislative sanction to the doctrine of contra non valentem
which read' "Liberative prescription is exceptionally suspended when
the filing or prosecution of a suit is prevented by the fraud of the
creditor or is made impossible by extraordinary circumstances totally
beyond the control of the plaintiff, and the accrual of prescription
would result in obvious injustice." REVISION, BOOK III, TITLE XXIV
(NEW), DOc. No. 1-29-2, art. 3467 (Council Meeting, Feb. 19, 1982), supra
note 35. The council of the Louisiana State Law Institute chose to
eliminate that paragraph and to insert instead a similar statement
in the comments. Comment (d) to NA 3467 provides that the
jurisprudence which adopted the doctrine of contra non valentem "con-
tinues to be relevant." Although the legislative intent is thus stated
clearly, there remains the analytical problem that comments are not
part of the law.
110. This version of NA 3468 and UA 3541 remain in force until
January 1, 1984. The cross references contained in UA 3541 make
no sense because of the rearrangement of titles and chapters by Act
187. See supra note 6. Before Act 187 was put into effect, the follow-
ing prescriptions ran against minors and interdicts by virtue of UA
3541: the liberative prescriptions of five years, UA 3540; three years,
UA 3538-3539; one year, UA 3534, 3536; and the liberative and
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in the preceding Article, those
provided in Paragraphs I and II
of Section three of Chapter three
of this Title, and those of thirty
years, whether acquisitive or
liberative, shall run against minors
acquisitive prescriptions of thirty years. These prescriptions continue
to run against minors and interdicts under the new law, which changes
the law only by adding the ten-year acquisitive prescription for im-
movables. See supra NA 3474. Additionally, UA 763 and LA. MIN.
CODE: LA. R.S. 31:58 provide that the prescription of nonuse of predial
and mineral servitudes respectively runs against minors and other
incompetents. See also LA. R.S. 9:5631 (1983). Thus, as far as it can be
determined, the only general prescriptions of the Civil Code which
are still suspended in favor of minors and interdicts and which "justify"
the existence of NA 3468 are: (1) the ten-year liberative prescription
of UA 3544 and 3546-3547, (2) the three-year and ten-year acquisitive
prescription of movables of NA 3490-3491, and (3) the prescription of
nonuse of a usufruct or habitation of UA 621 and 631, respectively.
For rights of use, the question is open. See UA 645. See also the special
provisions of UA 78, 2221 and 2571, and NA 3469 and 3542-3543.
One would search in vain to discover the logic behind this scheme
of the Civil Code, not so much because the Code allows so many-
numerically and in terms of importance -exceptions to swallow up
the "general" principle established by NA 3468 (OA 3522), but also
because there are no discernible criteria by which the various prescrip-
tions are classified in the one or the other category. It is not readily
understandable, for instance, why the ten-year acquisitive prescrip-
tion for immovables should run against minors, see NA 3474, and the
three-year or ten-year prescription for movables should not; nor why
the ten-year liberative prescription of UA 3544 should be suspended
but the one-year liberative prescription of UA 3536 should not be
suspended. Doubtless, this scheme is the result of historical accident
rather than deliberate planning, as evidenced by the piecemeal and
impromptu carving of exceptions out of the original general princi-
ple. Act 187 did not avail itself of the opportunity to rectify this
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and interdicted persons, reserv-
ing, however, recourse against
their tutors or curators.
These prescriptions shall also




absentees and incompetents, in-
cluding minors and interdicts,
unless exception is established by
legislation.'
Art. 3469. Suspension of Art. 3523. Husbands and wives
prescription Husbands and wives can not
Prescription is suspended as prescribe against each other.
between: the spouses during mar-
riage, parents and children during
minority, tutors and minors dur-
ing tutorship, and curators and in-
terdicts during interdiction."'
111. On June 24, 1983, after the completion of this article, the
legislature enacted Act 173 of 1983 which becomes effective on
January 1, 1984. Act 173 eliminates UA 3541 and replaces NA 3468,
as revised in 1982, with the new article accompanying this note, thus
eliminating the confusion described supra note 110. The former
"general" principle with regard to minors and other incompetents is
now reversed and streamlined with the truly general principle of NA
3467 applying to all persons. Prescription will now run against minors
and other incompetents unless they are expressly exempted by legisla-
tion. There remains, of course, the problem of whether the period
between June 24, 1983 and January 1, 1984, is long enough to satisfy
the "reasonable period" requirement of Lott v. Haley, 370 So. 2d 521
(La. 1979) and Reichenphader v. Allstate Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 648 (La.
1982). See Hargrave, Developments in the Law: Louisiana Constitutional
Law, 1980-1981, 42 LA. L. REV. 596, 601 (1982).
112. New article 3469 "clarifies the law," NA 3469, comment (a),
by providing that, in addition to spouses (OA 3523) prescription is
suspended between the persons named therein. For a discussion of





Art. 3470. Prescription during
delays for inventory; vacant
succession
Prescription runs during the
delay the law grants to a successor
for making an inventory and for
deliberating. Nevertheless, it does
not run against a beneficiary suc-
cessor with respect to his rights
against the succession.
Prescription runs against a va-
cant succession even if an ad-
ministrator has not been ap-
pointed.
Art. 3471. Limits of contractual
freedom
A juridical act purporting to
exclude prescription, to specify a
longer period than that establish-
ed by law, or to make the re-




Art. 3527. Prescription during
delays for inventory and
deliberation
It runs likewise during the
delay which the law grants for
making the inventory and for
deliberating.
Art. 3526. Beneficiary heir;
vacant succession
Prescription does not run
against a beneficiary heir, with
respect to the debt due him by the
succession.
But it runs against a vacant
succession, though no curator has
been appointed to such succession.
COMPUTATION OF TIME
Art. 3454. Computation of time
In computing a prescriptive
period, the day that marks the
commencement of prescription is
not counted. Prescription accrues
upon the expiration of the last day
of the prescriptive period, and if
that day is a legal holiday,
prescription accrues upon the ex-
piration of the next day that is not
a legal holiday.'
1 4
Art. 3467. Computation of time
by days
The time required for
prescription is reckoned by days,
and not by hours; it is only ac-
quired after the last day allowed
by law has elapsed.
113. The article is discussed supra notes 100-102.
114. Comment (a) to NA 3454 states that the article "is not in-
tended to change the law." (Emphasis added). Whether it does or not
depends on how one interprets the old law. It was arguable under
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Art. 5059. Computation of time
In computing a period of time allowed or prescribed by law or by
order of court, the date of the act, event, or default after which the period
begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period is to be
included, unless it is a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until
the end of the next day which is not a legal holiday.
A half-holiday is considered as a legal holiday. A legal holiday is to
be included in the computation of a period of time allowed or prescribed,
except when:
(1) it is expressly excluded;
(2) it would otherwise be the last day of the period; or
(3) the period is less than seven days.
Art. 3455. Computation of time
by months
If the prescriptive period con-
sists of one or more months,
prescription accrues upon the ex-
piration of the day of the last
month of the period that cor-
responds with the date of the com-
mencement of prescription, and if
there is no corresponding day,
prescription accrues upon the ex-
piration of the last day of the
period.
Art. 3468. Computation of time
by months
In those prescriptions which
are acquired by months, the
months are reckoned in the order
in which they occur in the calen-
dar, from the day when the posses-
sion commenced, whatever may be
the number of days which each
month may contain.
the old law that LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 5059 was not applicable to
prescriptions which could be interrupted without resorting to the
judicial machinery of the state. Thus, an acknowledgment by the
debtor or adverse possessor, or an eviction of the possessor by the
true owner, could effectively interrupt prescription even if it occur-
red on the last day of the prescription and even if the last day was
a holiday. See NA 3454, comment (c) ("[p]rescription is completed on
the fixed day, even if it be a holiday.") (quoting 1 M. PLANIOL, supra
note 45, pt. 2, no. 2657, at 577). However, since there are no cases
on point, the issue is now moot.
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Art. 3456. Computation of time Art. 3469. Computation of time
by years by years
If a prescriptive period con- In such prescriptions as are
sists of one or more years, prescrip- acquired in one or more years, the
tion accrues upon the expiration of time is reckoned according to the
the day of the last year that cor- years of the calendar which have
responds with the date of the com- elapsed during the time of posses-
mencement of prescription."' sion required by law.
PEREMPTION'16
Art. 3458. Peremption; effect
Peremption is a period of time
fixed by law for the existence of
a right. Unless timely exercised,
the right is extinguished upon the
expiration of the peremptive
period.
115. New articles 3455-3456 clarify and broaden slightly OA
3468-3469 by making sure that these articles apply to both acquisitive
and liberative prescription. Note the word "possession" in OA
3468-3469. See NA 3468, comment (b); NA 3469, comment (b). It is
hoped that the following illustrations will clarify even further the
operation of NA 3455-3456. (1) A six-month prescription which com-
menced running on January 31, 1983 will accrue on July 31, 1983.
(2) A six-month prescription which commenced running on December
31, 1982 will accrue on June 30, 1983. (3) A six-month prescription
which commenced running on August 31, 1982 accrued on February
28, 1983. (4) A five-year prescription which commenced running on
February 29, 1980 will accrue on February 28, 1985. In the latter situa-
tion NA 3455 applies by analogy. See NA 3456, comment (c).
116. Although not regulated expressly by the Civil Code of 1870,
the institution of peremption was recognized by the jurisprudence and
articulated with the aid of academic doctrine. See Pounds v. Schori,
377 So. 2d 1195 (La. 1979); Succession of Pizzillo, 223 La. 328, 65 So.
2d 783 (1953); Guillory v. Avoyelles Ry. Co., 104 La. 11, 28 So. 899
(1900); Ashbey v. Ashbey, 41 La. Ann. 102, 5 So. 539 (1889); Dainow,
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-1968 Term-
Prescription, 29 LA. L. REV. 230 (1969). The new Act codifies that
jurisprudence in NA 3458-3461. These articles are self-explanatory and
the differences from prescription are obvious.
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Art. 3459. Application of rules of
prescription
The provisions on prescription
governing computation of time
apply to peremption.
Art. 3460. Peremption need not
be pleaded
Peremption may be pleaded or
it may be supplied by a court on
its own motion at any time prior
to final judgment.
Art. 3461. Renunciation, interrup-
tion, or suspension in-
effective
Peremption may not be re-
nounced, interrupted, or sus-
pended.
ONE CONCLUDING NOTE
If the measure of success of a revision is the degree to which it
improves on the old law, then Act 187 is an unqualified success. It is
a remarkable improvement over the repealed law, both structurally
and substantively. The revision eliminates the dry wood that was so
prevalent in the old law not just because of its age. It replaces the
verbose provisions of the old law with concise and precise articles densely
interwoven with each other. It resolves most of the substantive pro-
blems that have been plaguing the jurisprudence for so long, while it
also codifies some of the best jurisprudential accomplishments. A few
problems remain unresolved and some new ones have been created (most-
ly by the laconic and somewhat elliptical language of the new Act), which
this paper has tried to identify. But these problems are not insurmount-
able. They can be resolved by an intelligent reading of the new Act,
a comparison of it with the old law, and a careful reading of the com-
ments. All in all, the Reporter and the redactors must be commended
for successfully accomplishing what they set out to do.
This author's reservations pertain to the intended scope and range
of the revision as understood by the redactors. It seems that they felt
unduly constrained by the confines of the old law. The repeated use
by the comments of the adage "it does not change the law" (even when
not one hundred percent accurate) is a good indication of the
psychological and political climate within which the redactors had to
operate, a climate in which everything was to be justified in terms of
1983]
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the old law and changes were to be kept to a minimum. Indeed it is
hard to overstate the importance of stability and continuity in the law
of property. However, there comes a point when change and progress
must also be accommodated. The Louisiana of the 1980's bears little
resemblance to the Louisiana of 1825-or, for that matter, to nineteenth
century France-if only because of the oil business and the increase
in population and land utilization. In the face of these changes the revi-
sion ought to have taken some bolder steps in devising new solutions
to old and new problems. The revision could have, also for the same
reasons, taken some steps to emancipate Louisiana's law from that of
France. There is in Louisiana sufficient accumulation of experience and
robust indigenous legal brainpower to permit and support such an eman-
cipation. More importantly, the socioeconomic and legal environment
in Louisiana is sufficiently different from that of France to require such
an emancipation. This idea may sound iconoclastic, but it cannot, as
this author's name may suggest, be attributed to xenophobia.
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